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This thesis will study the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, signed into law 
by President George W. Bush on December 8, 2003, which 
amended title XVIII of the Social Security Act. 
Specifically, the thesis will focus on the addition of a 
prescription drug benefit to Medicare. Analyzed in this 
thesis will be the legislative process the bill followed in 
the first session of the 108th Congress, the influence of 
party politics and special interest groups on the bill, the 
major concerns of policy makers associated with the 
addition of the benefit, the provisions finally approved in 
Public Law 108-173, and issues that continue to be 
discussed by the second session of the 108th Congress. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary question answered by this thesis is: 
• What were the major policy compromises underlying 
the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003 and the major problems 
that have been identified subsequent to the 
passage? 
The subsidiary questions explained and answered by 
this thesis are: 
• What was the primary problem addressed by the 
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003? 
• What were the positions taken by the major 
participants involved with the bill’s creation 
and passage of the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, i.e., 
the political parties, the interest groups, the 
White House, the Senate, and the House? 
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• What were the major provisions of the 
prescription drug benefit in the Medicare 
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization 
Act of 2003? 
• What compromises were reached to allow passage 
and presidential approval? 
• What policy problems associated with the 
legislation have emerged in the second session of 
the 108th Congress? 
C. DISCUSSION 
A top priority of the Bush Administration was to 
strengthen and improve Medicare by expanding benefits and 
ensuring it will be available for future generations. The 
Administration allocated $400 billion over a ten-year 
period in the fiscal year 2004 President’s Budget for the 
reforms. The most significant improvement to Medicare was 
the availability of a prescription drug benefit. 
The budget for FY2004 was not the first time a 
prescription drug benefit or other reforms were attempted 
to change Medicare. Congress had been debating legislation 
for the expansion and reform of Medicare since the Clinton 
Administration. Both the House and the Senate introduced 
bills for FY2000 to provide outpatient prescription drugs 
to Medicare beneficiaries, but the Clinton budget did not 
include a plan for Medicare reform, and the bills were not 
passed by either side of Congress. The FY2001 budget 
submitted by President Clinton in February of 2000 had a 
prescription drug benefit proposal of $100 billion, 
covering the period between 2003 and 2010. During this 
second session of the 106th Congress, the House passed H.R. 
4680 in June of 2000 that provided for a voluntary program 
for prescription drug coverage under the Medicare Program, 
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as well as additional Medicare reforms. The bill was 
introduced in the Senate, and no further action was taken. 
President Bush’s first budget for FY2002 had an amount 
of $153 billion over ten years for Medicare modernization 
and reform, to include a prescription drug benefit. No 
bills were passed by the first session of the 107th 
Congress. The FY2003 budget submitted by President Bush 
included $190 billion over ten years for Medicare 
modernization and prescription drug benefits. During this 
second session of the 107th Congress, the House passed H.R. 
4954 that provided for voluntary prescription drug coverage 
and reformed the payment and regulatory structure of the 
Medicare Program. The bill was received in the Senate where 
it was not considered for further action. 
In June of 2003, two bills were introduced in 
Congress, one each in the House of Representatives and the 
Senate, to address the President’s budget request. Debate 
and compromise surrounded the two bills between June and 
November of 2003. A Conference Report was agreed to at the 
end of November by both sides, the final version of the 
bill was presented to the President, and it was signed into 
law on December 8, 2003, making Public Law 108-173 the most 
significant and expensive change to Medicare since its 
establishment in 1965. 
D. SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis will provide a background on the Medicare 
system, explain the major issues to consider in the design 
of a prescription drug benefit, discuss the major sources 
of controversy within the debate on the prescription drug 
benefit, investigate how the issues were resolved, and how 
special interest groups influenced the passage of the bill. 
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Furthermore, it will describe the provisions of the 
prescription drug benefit, examine the cost estimates of 
the benefit, and discuss issues that were unresolved, and 
are being debated by Congress during its second session in 
2004. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in the research for this thesis 
consists of a review of appropriate literature and cost 
estimates by the Office of Management and Budget, a review 
of legislation introduced in Congress, testimony brought 
before Congress, literature and cost estimates by the 
Congressional Budget Office, a review of literature and 
cost estimates from the Department of Health and Human 
Services, a review of literature and audits performed by 
the Government Accountability Office, and a review of 
literature available from special interest groups, research 
foundations, and think-tanks. 
F. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II provides an introduction to Medicare and 
its components, gives an overview of the Medicare Trust 
Fund and how Medicare is financed, and provides a summary 
of the major Medicare policy changes since its creation. 
The chapter continues with a discussion of the major fiscal 
challenges facing Medicare, and trends in national 
healthcare and prescription drug spending. The chapter ends 
with a discussion of the reasons for adding a prescription 
drug benefit to the Medicare program and factors to 
consider when designing prescription drug coverage. 
Chapter III introduces recent attempts by the 
President and Congress to add outpatient drug benefits to 
Medicare. It discusses recent actions of Congress to create 
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a prescription drug benefit, compares the different views 
of various stakeholders, such as Republicans and Democrats, 
in creating the benefit, and discusses other special 
interest groups, and their influences. The chapter 
concludes with an introduction to President Bush’s Proposal 
for Medicare reform and prescription drug coverage in 2003. 
Chapter IV discusses the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, the process and 
evolution of the bill in Congress, the major compromises 
underlying the prescription drug benefit, the primary 
provisions of the legislation, and the controversy 
surrounding the bill. 
Chapter V examines the fiscal impacts of the bill on 
the Medicare trust fund and beneficiaries, and discusses 
changes to the bill debated in the second session of the 
108th Congress. It also summarizes the issues presented in 
the previous chapters regarding the Medicare prescription 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. MANDATORY SPENDING AND ENTITLEMENTS 
The federal government divides its budget into two 
main categories: discretionary and mandatory spending. 
Mandatory spending consists of benefit programs such as 
Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. These programs are 
also referred to as entitlements. Congress generally 
determines spending for entitlement programs by setting 
rules for eligibility, benefit formulas, and other 
parameters, rather than by appropriating specific dollar 
amounts each year (Congressional Budget Office [CBO], 
January 2004, p. 48). In short, the government is required 
to pay for benefits claimed under these programs. Figure 
2.1 shows federal spending for mandatory and discretionary 
programs for select years, 1962, 1982, and 2002. Medicare 
and Medicaid did not exist in 1962, and the large increase 
in mandatory spending resulting from their establishment is 
illustrated in this figure. Figure 2.2 shows how much of 
the federal budget went towards specific spending 
categories, including the big three entitlement programs, 
during the same years. Defense and other discretionary 
spending have decreased while Social Security, Medicare and 
Medicaid have increased their share of federal spending. 
B. INTRODUCTION TO MEDICARE AND MEDICARE TRUST FUNDS 
Medicare is a national health insurance program for 
the elderly and certain disabled people. President Harry S. 
Truman first proposed its creation in 1945 in a special 
message to Congress calling for a comprehensive, prepaid 
medical insurance plan accessible to all elderly, and 
financed through the Social Security system and federal 
8 
revenues (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid [CMS] Website, 
July 2004). The American Medical Association immediately 
blasted the Truman administration, and squelched all 
attempts at legislation by Truman’s Congressional allies 
for what was called “socialized medicine.” 
 
Figure 2.1. Analysis of Federal Spending for Mandatory 
and Discretionary Programs in 1962, 1982, and 2002. (From 
Walker, 2003, p.11). 
 
Figure 2.2. Structure of Federal Spending by Budget 
Category in 1962, 1982, 2002. (From Walker, 2003, p.10). 
9 
The idea was proposed again in 1951 by the head of the 
Federal Security Administration (now the Social Security 
Administration), and between 1958 and 1965 Congress held 
annual hearings for health insurance proposals for the 
elderly. 
1. Medicare Enacted  
In 1964 President Lyndon B. Johnson was elected by a 
landslide, and a large shift to a Democratic majority in 
Congress also occurred. Legislation for Medicare in 1964 
consisted of a Democratic proposal called the King-Anderson 
bill, and a Republican-supported proposal called the Byrnes 
bill. The King-Anderson bill mainly included coverage for 
hospitalization in a universally available social insurance 
plan. The Republican proposal was a voluntary program that 
was financed by premiums paid by the beneficiaries and 
subsidies from the Treasury’s general fund. The Byrnes bill 
included benefits for physician services and prescription 
drug coverage. 
In March of 1965, a compromise between the Democrats 
and Republicans joined the two bills, and it was sent to 
the House Ways and Means committee for mark up. The result 
was Title XVIII amending the Social Security Act of 1935, 
and was composed of Medicare Part A or Hospital Insurance, 
and Medicare Part B or Supplemental Medical Insurance. The 
resulting legislation excluded one benefit that was 
proposed by the Byrnes bill due to supposedly unpredictable 
and potentially high costs (Marmor, 2000). The missing 
benefit was outpatient prescription drug coverage. On July 
30th, President Johnson signed Title XVIII into law. On July 
1st of the following year, nineteen million elderly 
Americans enrolled in Medicare (CMS Website, July 2004). 
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In 1972, Medicare was expanded to allow the disabled 
and those with permanent kidney failure to enroll in the 
program. Two million more beneficiaries were allowed to 
enroll in Medicare that year (CMS Website, July 2004). 
2. Medicare Components 
Because of the two proposals that were combined to 
create Medicare in 1965, Medicare services were divided 
into two components. 
a. Medicare Part A: Hospital Insurance (HI) 
Medicare Part A is also known as the Hospital 
Insurance (HI) program. It covers almost all Americans aged 
65 or older, disabled persons receiving Social Security or 
Railroad Retirement benefits, and people with end-stage 
renal disease (ESRD) (Office of Management and Budget 
[OMB], 1999). A small number of people aged 65 or older are 
not eligible for Medicare Part A because they or their 
spouses never paid Medicare taxes; however, Part A is 
available to these people if they pay a monthly premium. 
Coverage provided by Medicare Part A includes costs 
associated with inpatient hospital stays, services provided 
by skilled nursing facilities, home health care, and 
hospice services. Inpatient prescription drugs are also 
covered in Part A of Medicare. 
Part A reimbursement is provided by the Hospital 
Insurance (HI) Trust Fund. The HI Trust Fund is financed 
primarily by a 2.9-percent payroll tax on working 
Americans’ earnings, split between employers and employees 
at 1.45 percent each. The payroll tax accounts for 
approximately 90 percent of the HI Trust Fund revenues, and 
taxes collected each year are used to pay the hospital 
benefits of current beneficiaries. The HI Trust Fund is 
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also funded by interest on trust fund investments, premiums 
of non-invested beneficiaries, deductibles and coinsurance, 
and income taxes on social security benefits (Medicare 
Payment Advisory Committee [MedPAC], 2004, p. 71). Revenues 
for Part A of Medicare are highly dependent on the number 
of working Americans, as well as how much they earn. 
b. Medicare Part B, Supplemental Medical 
Insurance (SMI) 
The Supplemental Medical Insurance (SMI), or 
Medicare Part B, covers services provided by physicians, 
outpatient hospital care, and suppliers of medical 
equipment. Part B coverage is optional, and is available to 
those who are also entitled to Part A. Approximately 95 
percent of those enrolled in Part A also opt for Part B. 
Financing for Part B differs from Part A in that 
enrollees are required to pay monthly premiums if they 
choose to participate in Part B coverage. The premiums 
account for about 25 percent of the Part B costs, and most 
beneficiaries pay their Part B premiums as deductions from 
their Social Security earnings. Also unlike the HI Trust 
Fund, the SMI trust fund is directly connected to the 
general fund of the U.S. Treasury. The majority of the 
remaining 75 percent of trust fund obligations are 
subsidized by general taxpayer dollars. 
c. The HI and SMI Trust Funds 
Unlike private trust funds, federal trust funds 
are not channels to set aside savings for the future. They 
are primarily budget accounting mechanisms used to record 
revenues and expenses earmarked for specific purposes. 
As mentioned previously, the HI and SMI trust 
funds are financed in completely different ways. HI trust 
12 
fund financing must remain separate from general revenues, 
and payroll taxes cannot be increased or decreased without 
passage of legislation to change the tax rate. For the SMI 
trust fund, premiums and general revenue financing are 
reestablished annually to match expected costs for the 
following year (Boards of Trustees, 2004, p. 6). 
Additionally, current law requires that if a 
federal trust fund like the HI trust fund runs a surplus of 
payroll tax receipts over benefit payments, that surplus 
must be invested in Treasury securities and used to meet 
current cash needs of the government. These securities are 
considered to be reserves, and are an asset to the trust 
fund. When a trust fund runs a cash deficit, it redeems 
these securities to pay benefit expenses exceeding current 
payroll tax proceeds (Walker, 2003, p. 4). If the HI trust 
fund runs a cash deficit (benefit expenses exceed payroll 
tax revenues) for an extended period of time, and the 
securities become exhausted, the trust fund is deemed 
insolvent. 
Because SMI receives 75 percent of its funds from 
general revenues, and annual adjustments are made to the 
general revenue and premium amounts expected to cover SMI 
expenses, financing for SMI is always projected to meet 
costs (Boards of Trustees, 2004, p. 13). Later in this 
chapter the historical expenditures and projected costs 
associated with Medicare Part B and its impact on the 
general funds as it relates to the Gross Domestic Product 




C. FISCAL CHALLENGES FACING MEDICARE 
It is important to understand the situation Congress 
faced when it was tasked by President Bush to modernize 
Medicare, and to include outpatient prescription drug 
coverage. While Medicare reforms impacted the future of 
both the HI and SMI trust funds, the prescription drug 
benefit primarily impacted the SMI trust fund. 
1. Trends Impacting Medicare 
The major impacts on the future of Medicare are shifts 
in the demographic composition of the United States 
population, the increase in per beneficiary utilization of 
Medicare services, and nationwide increases in expenditures 
on healthcare services. Some of these trends are not 
necessarily unique to Medicare, but are issues facing 
society and the economy as a whole (Holtz-Eakin, April 
2003, p.1). 
a. Demographic Shifts  
The number of beneficiaries eligible for Medicare 
and their relationship to the number of working Americans 
impacts both the HI and SMI trust funds. Since its 
creation, the number of Medicare beneficiaries has 
increased, from 19,108,822 in 1966 to 41,086,981 in 2003, 
for a total increase of 115 percent (CMS Website, July 
2004). 
The number of beneficiaries will grow 
significantly with the pending eligibility of the ‘baby 
boom’ generation, which analysts define as those born 
between 1946 and 1965. Baby boomers will start becoming 
eligible for Medicare in 2010 (Boards of Trustees, 2004, 
p.7). Figure 2.3 depicts the total number of beneficiaries 
enrolled in Medicare since 1970 with projections to 2080. 
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In 2010, the expected number of beneficiaries climbs to 
46,592,000. By 2030, the number of beneficiaries is 
projected to more than double current enrollment at 
79,063,000 (Boards of Trustees, 2004, p.27). 
 
Figure 2.3. Medicare Enrollment 1970–2080. (From MedPAC, 
2004, p.6). 
 
As the baby boom generation begins to retire and 
become eligible for Medicare, there will be an increase in 
the share of elderly in the population, and the ratio of 
workers to beneficiaries will decrease. Some reasons for 
the demographic shift are a lower fertility rate, earlier 
retirement ages, and longevity. In the 1960s, the birth 
rate was three children to each woman. In 2003 the number 
was estimated at just over two children, and the projected 
birth rate in 2030 is 1.95 children (Walker, 2003, p. 6). 
Figure 2.4 shows the ratio of workers to HI beneficiaries 
from 1970 projected to 2070. In 1970 there were 4.6 
American workers to each beneficiary, and in 2000 the ratio 
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shrunk to 4.0. When the baby boomers begin to retire in 
2010, the relative number of working-age Americans to 
beneficiaries is projected to decrease to 3.7, and shrink 
even further to 3.0 workers by 2030. The ratio of working-
age Americans to those in retirement has a significant 
impact on the financing of both Medicare and Social 
Security. As mentioned earlier, the HI Trust Fund is 
financed by a tax of 1.45 percent of each worker’s 
paycheck. If the number of workers relative to 
beneficiaries decreases, there will be less revenue for the 
HI Trust Fund. 
 
Figure 2.4. Ratio of Workers to Beneficiaries. (From 
Walker, 2003, p.5). 
 
This ratio also impacts the SMI Trust Fund. If 
the ratio of workers to beneficiaries decreases, there are 
relatively fewer workers contributing to the general fund 
through income tax revenues, and there are relatively more 
Medicare beneficiaries drawing from the SMI Trust Fund. The 
increases in SMI Trust Fund outlays will be a larger share 
of the federal income, and an increased burden on the 
federal budget. This trend impacts the solvency of the HI 
trust fund and the sustainability of the SMI trust fund. 
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b. Per Beneficiary Utilization 
In addition to the growing number of 
beneficiaries eligible for Medicare once the baby boom 
generation begins to turn 65, the average age of Medicare 
beneficiaries is also increasing. Retirees are living 
longer, a trend dubbed the “aging of society.” One impact 
of the longevity of beneficiaries is a higher per- person 
utilization of Medicare services. The impact is a result of 
the fact that older beneficiaries use a higher percentage 
of services than younger beneficiaries. Table 2.1 
illustrates the break out of Medicare enrollment based on 
the age of beneficiaries. Since 1966, the percentage of 
enrolled beneficiaries aged 75 and older has steadily 
increased, while the percentage of beneficiaries aged 65 to 
74 has decreased. This trend leads to increases in Medicare 
expenditures per enrollee. Figure 2.5 illustrates that 
older beneficiaries account for a disproportionate 
percentage of expenditures. Beneficiaries aged 85+ account 
for only 11 percent of enrollment, but 16 percent of 
expenditures. In fact, the costliest 10 percent of 
beneficiaries accounted for almost 70 percent of total 
expenditures in Medicare in 2001 (MedPAC, 2004, p.70). 
 
Table 2.1. Medicare HI Enrollment Distribution by Age 
(From CMS Website). 
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Figure 2.5. Medicare Enrollment and Expenditures Based 
on Age. (From MedPAC, 2004, p.4). 
 
c. Increase in Healthcare Expenditures 
Another trend impacting the future of Medicare is 
the increase in national healthcare expenditures. Over the 
past few decades, national personal healthcare expenditures 
as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product have increased 
significantly. One reason for the growth in expenditures is 
the increased utilization of new and more expensive medical 
technologies. (Other factors include enhancements in health 
insurance coverage, increasing per capita income, medical 
price inflation which exceeds general inflation, and the 
aging of society (Holtz-Eakin, March 2003, p.3).) 
Figure 2.6 illustrates the historical trend of 
personal healthcare expenditures as it relates to GDP from 
1980 to 2003. Personal health spending was 7.7 percent of 
GDP in 1980, and increased to 12.8 percent in 2003. Over 
the same period of time, Medicare expenditures doubled as a 
percentage of GDP, from 1.3 percent in 1980 to 2.6 percent 
in 2003 (MedPAC, 2004, p.66). 
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Figure 2.6. National Personal Healthcare Expenditures as 
a Percent of GDP. (From MedPAC, 2004, p.65). 
 
To place the trend in another perspective, the 
cost of healthcare per person has also increased over the 
years, and this trend is not only seen in Medicare 
expenditures, but across the nation. National healthcare 
spending per person grew at an average annual rate of 4.5 
percent between 1970 and 2002, or in 2002 dollars, it 
increased from $1,321 in 1970 to $5,366 in 2002 (Holtz-
Eakin, March 2003, p.3). This rate of growth surpasses the 
growth in the nation’s economy during the same period of 
time by 2.4 percent. 
Combined, these three trends create a precarious 
future for Medicare’s solvency and sustainability. The 
ultimate question is not whether the trust funds have 
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enough assets to finance the expenditures, but whether the 
government and the economy can afford the entitlements at 
the opportunity cost of financing other government 
programs. 
D. REASONS FOR A MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT 
As mentioned in the preceding section, Medicare 
currently faces huge problems that impact its 
sustainability. Added to these challenges were concerns 
about gaps in the Medicare program that would leave 
beneficiaries vulnerable to huge out-of-pocket costs, such 
as the lack of outpatient prescription drug benefits. With 
these challenges in front of them, the 1st session of the 
108th Congress began the 2003 legislative year with the goal 
to create a bill to modernize Medicare and add an 
outpatient prescription drug benefit. 
1. Results of Excluding Outpatient Drug Coverage 
When the Medicare legislation in 1965 excluded 
outpatient prescription drug coverage, it prompted the 
creation of other sources of coverage for beneficiaries. 
Among the options available were employer-sponsored plans 
for retired and current employees, privately purchased 
supplemental plans or Medigap, Medicare + Choice, and 
Medicaid. Having these options available to a majority of 
beneficiaries caused Congress to delay any amendments to 
the Medicare Program that included an outpatient 
prescription drug benefit. 
Figure 2.7 shows the sources of prescription drug 
coverage among Medicare beneficiaries as of 2001. It 
indicates that 80 percent of beneficiaries had some source 
of coverage while almost 20 percent of beneficiaries had no 
coverage at all. Figure 2.8 shows the sources of payment 
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for prescription drugs among Medicare beneficiaries in 
2001. Even though 80 percent of beneficiaries had 
prescription drug coverage, they still paid nearly 35 
percent of the costs out of pocket. The next largest 
payment source was employer-sponsored coverage at almost 31 
percent. 
 
Figure 2.7. Sources of Outpatient Prescription Drug 
Coverage Among Medicare Beneficiaries, 2001 (From MedPAC, 
2004, p.157). 
 
2. Amendments Include Physician-dispensed Drugs 
Between the years of Medicare’s expansion in 1972 and 
2001, Congress added amendments to Medicare providing for 
payments to physicians who provide drugs to beneficiaries 
during office visits; Part B of Medicare would cover these 
drug expenditures. Most drugs were for treatment of 
diseases such as cancer and anemia related to renal 
disease. In 1992, costs for the physician-dispensed drugs 
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covered by Medicare were $700 million. In 2001, 454 drugs 
were included in Part B coverage, at an annual cost of $6.4 
billion. Figure 2.9 shows Medicare spending for drugs 
covered under Part B, and annual growth rates. The large 
increase in costs for the physician-dispensed drugs covered 
by Medicare Part B caught the attention of several 
lawmakers. Additionally, the inspector general for the 
Department of Health and Human Services estimated that 
Medicare was paying two to ten times more than wholesale 
prices for the drugs being dispensed by physicians (Oliver, 
Lee, Lipton, 2004, p.292). 
 
Figure 2.8. Sources of Payment for Prescription Drugs 




Figure 2.9. Medicare Spending and Annual Growth Rates 
for Part B Covered Drugs (From MedPAC, 2004, p.161). 
 
3. National Prescription Drug Usage Trend 
The reported reason not to include outpatient 
prescription drug benefits as part of the original 1965 
Medicare legislation was due to the unpredictable and 
potentially high costs related to prescription drugs. At 
the time Medicare was enacted, prescription drug costs were 
10 percent of national health spending (Oliver et al, 2004, 
p. 291). According to the Congressional Budget Office, in 
2003, prescription drug costs were still only 10 percent of 
national health spending (Holtz-Eakin, March 2003, p. 3). 
Based on these figures, drug costs as a percentage of 
national health spending have not changed drastically over 
the long-term. However, total national healthcare 
expenditures have increased and, in the last ten years, 
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prescription drug spending has increased at a rate higher 
than overall healthcare spending. In 1980, national 
healthcare spending totaled $245.8 billion and prescription 
drug spending totaled $12.0 billion (4.9 percent). In 1990, 
total healthcare spending more than doubled to $696 billion 
while prescription drug spending more than tripled to $40.3 
billion (5.8 percent). By 2000, total healthcare spending 
grew to $1,299.5 billion while spending for prescription 
drugs more than tripled again to $121.8 billion (9.4 
percent) (CMS Website, August 2004). The growth in 
prescription drug spending was much steeper than national 
healthcare expenditures in the last 20 years. On a per 
capita basis, spending on prescription drugs grew at an 
average rate of nine percent per year between 1990 and 2002 
while all other healthcare expenditures grew at an average 
annual rate of three percent. (Holtz-Eakin, March 2003, 
p.3). 
Table 2.2 shows annual expenditures on prescription 
drugs in the U.S. from 1996 to 2001, the annual growth in 
prescription drug expenditures, and the annual growth in 
healthcare expenditures during the same period of time. The 
average annual growth rate in national prescription drug 
expenditures between 1996 and 2001 was 15.9 percent. The 
average annual growth rate in national healthcare 
expenditures, however, was only 6.5 percent in that same 
time period. The data above and in Table 2.2 indicate that 
prescription drug spending has increased rapidly in recent 
years, while staying steady at 10 percent of total national 
healthcare expenditures since Medicare’s creation. 
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Table 2.2. National Expenditures for Prescription Drugs 
and Healthcare from 1996 to 2001 (From Walker, 2003, p.17). 
 
E. DESIGNING A PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT 
Adding a benefit to Medicare as large as outpatient 
prescription drug coverage requires the consideration of 
many factors. Benefit design impacts many things, and may 
cause unintended consequences if incentives are not 
compatible with the desired outcomes of the lawmakers. The 
benefit design may impact the drug industry by affecting 
demand and pricing of prescription drugs, and enrollment in 
the program is impacted by possibly attracting the people 
with the highest drug costs. These two factors will 
potentially impact the desire of private companies to 
administer the drug benefit. The design of the benefit may 
also affect how federal and state programs operate, such as 
Medicaid, as well as the other parts of Medicare, such as 
Part A. The choices of a design for a prescription drug 
benefit in Medicare may also affect other parts of the 




1. Structure and Scope of the Drug Coverage 
Important decisions in the design of the benefit are 
the scope and structure of the prescription drug benefit. 
How extensive to make the coverage and how widely available 
to make enrollment must be decided while trying to keep the 
benefit affordable and sustainable for the beneficiaries 
and the federal government. The scope and structure of the 
coverage have the greatest impact on the cost of the 
prescription drug benefit. 
a. Structure  
The choices that form the structure of the plan 
include the deductible amounts, the cost-sharing rates, the 
benefit caps, and the catastrophic stop-loss amounts (CBO, 
2002, p.10). Figure 2.10 illustrates a notional structure 
for a prescription drug benefit, depicting the elements of 
structure described below. 
 
Figure 2.10. Hypothetical Structure of a Medicare 





(1) Deductibles. The deductible amount 
determines when coverage begins. If there were no 
deductible, coverage would begin immediately with the first 
dollar spent by the beneficiary. If the deductible were 
$250, it would begin with the 251st dollar spent. 
(2) Cost-sharing. The cost-sharing rates 
determine how much of the cost of a prescription drug is 
paid by the enrolled beneficiary. If coinsurance is 50 
percent of the cost, the portion of the cost not paid by 
the beneficiary is paid by the combination of SMI incomes 
(taxpayer dollars from the general fund or enrollee’s 
premiums). Cost sharing in the above scenario begins at the 
251st dollar spent on prescription drugs, and continues to 
the initial coverage limit. 
(3) Benefit Cap. Benefit caps determine the 
total amount of coverage to be made available by the plan, 
beyond which the enrollee picks up the additional drug 
costs. If the initial coverage limit is set at $2,500, the 
enrollee must pay the full cost of all prescriptions 
beginning with the 2,501st dollar. In the above scenario, 
the benefit cap is equal to 50 percent of the difference 
between the initial coverage limit and the deductible paid 
by the beneficiary. So, the benefit cap is (.50) x ($2,500  
- $2,250) = $1,125. 
(4) Stop-loss. Catastrophic stop-loss 
determines the level of beneficiary out-of-pocket spending 
at which the benefit begins to pay all or most of the 
prescription drug costs. If the stop-loss is set at $6,000 
of out-of-pocket costs, at $6,001, the cost is paid by the 
SMI trust fund. 
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(5) The doughnut hole. Between the benefit 
cap and the catastrophic stop-loss there is a gap in the 
coverage, also known as a ‘doughnut hole’. In the above 
scenario, the benefit would have a gap in coverage between 
$1,125 and $6,000. The beneficiaries would have to pay all 
prescription drug expenses out-of-pocket between $1,125 and 
$6,000. 
b. Scope 
The scope of drug coverage will determine who is 
eligible for the benefit, how much coverage will be given 
to the beneficiaries, and, ultimately, the level of and 
structure of federal subsidies. Traditionally, Medicare has 
been a universal benefit based on age and/or disability. By 
this we mean that all beneficiaries are eligible for the 
same coverage regardless of annual income, assets, or 
enrollment in other insurance plans. 
(1) Enrollment Eligibility. Design of the 
benefit for prescription drugs requires decisions about who 
the eligible beneficiaries will be and what criteria must 
be met. For example, would everyone be eligible who is 
enrolled in Part A and/or Part B? Will it only be available 
for the elderly? Will the criteria be based on income, or 
whether a beneficiary has drug coverage through another 
healthcare plan? The answers to these questions are 
essential to the design of the outpatient prescription drug 
benefit, and are an important factor in determining the 
cost. 
(2) Voluntary Enrollment. Other decisions 
that affect enrollment are whether enrollment will be 
voluntary and if there will be restrictions on voluntary 
enrollment that will limit when beneficiaries may choose to 
enroll, or if they incur penalties for late enrollment or 
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dropping of the drug coverage. This could prevent “adverse 
selection” where those with higher-than-average expected 
costs have disproportionately higher enrollment in an 
insurance or drug plan. This could also lead insurers who 
administer plans to create a plan that discourages costly 
beneficiaries from enrolling through the use of marketing 
strategies, premium costs, or co-payment expenses. 
(3) Level and Structure of Federal 
Subsidies. How much the federal government would contribute 
to the cost of drug coverage for beneficiaries of Medicare 
and how these subsidies would be structured are also 
important design decisions that have a large impact on the 
costs of the prescription drug benefit (CBO, 2002, p.11). 
The higher the subsidy paid by the 
government, the greater the number of enrollees there will 
be, and, obviously, the higher the costs to the government. 
A penalty for late enrollment would provide an incentive to 
younger beneficiaries to enroll and reduce the impact of 
the adverse selection resulting from higher enrollment of 
older, higher-cost beneficiaries. 
Providing additional subsidies for lower 
income beneficiaries would also affect enrollment numbers 
and costs to the federal government. The costs to the 
federal government can be limited by allowing only those 
beneficiaries whose incomes fall between certain levels to 
be eligible for the benefit. This saves costs, as studies 
have shown, due to the probability of lower income 
beneficiaries to require more, and more expensive 
prescription drugs. If subsidies were based on income 
level, it would also affect state and federal programs such 
as Medicaid. Perhaps most importantly, it would also be the 
first time that Medicare benefits were based on income. 
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For beneficiaries who also receive 
prescription drug benefits through other means, such as 
employer-based health plans, the willingness of the 
employer-based plans to continue to provide benefits to 
Medicare beneficiaries is likely to be impacted. If 
employers are aware of the eligibility of their employees 
for prescription drug coverage through Medicare, they may 
minimize the coverage in order to divert the costs of the 
more expensive employees from the health plans and towards 
Medicare. The impact, again, would be higher costs to the 
federal government for enrolling more of the 36 percent of 
beneficiaries covered by employer-based health plans. It 
may be in the interest of the federal government to provide 
subsidies to the employer-sponsored plans to maintain the 
level of benefits for Medicare-eligible beneficiaries, 
thereby keeping them enrolled in the private plans. 
2. Administration of the Prescription Drug Benefit 
The costs of the drug benefit would also be affected 
by the way the benefit is administered. Several models can 
be used as a framework for administering a drug benefit. 
The models most widely available for application to 
Medicare are the strategies being used by the private 
sector, that is, common employer-sponsored health plans, or 
the Federal Employees’ Health Benefits Program (FEHBP). 
Common private sector methods include the use of 
organizations called pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs). 
Pharmacy benefit managers offer comprehensive drug benefit 
packages to managed care organizations, employer groups, 
and other payers. They control costs by providing generic 
substitution programs and brand name products that are 
substantially discounted compared to those sold by retail 
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pharmacies. These companies negotiate prices by acting as 
intermediaries between pharmaceutical manufacturers and 
wholesalers, third-party payers, and pharmacies. PBMs also 
perform administrative functions such as claim processing 
and payment. How many PBMs would be used, and what regions 
they would serve are decisions of the designer of the 
prescription drug benefit. Other important decisions would 
be restrictions on the PBMs, how they would compete for 
enrollees, and how much insurance risk they would assume. 
Most Federal Employee Health Benefits (FEHB) providers use 
PBMs. 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the creation and design of 
Medicare, fiscal challenges facing Medicare, reasons for 
adding a prescription drug benefit to Medicare, and factors 
to consider when designing a benefit such as outpatient 
prescription drug coverage. The next chapter discusses 
recent attempts to add an outpatient prescription drug 
benefit to Medicare, how differing views of the House and 
Senate, the Democrats and the Republicans, and special 
interest groups impact creation of this legislation, and 
introduce the proposal by President Bush in the budget for 
fiscal year 2004 to add a prescription drug benefit to 
Medicare. 
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III. MEDICARE REFORM AND OUTPATIENT DRUG BENEFITS 
This chapter discusses recent attempts to add 
outpatient prescription drug benefits and introduce reforms 
to Medicare through legislation. It introduces various 
stakeholders, their views, and typical positions regarding 
the efforts to reform Medicare. Finally, it introduces the 
proposal in 2003 by President Bush to reform Medicare and 
provide a prescription drug benefit that laid the 
foundation Congress had to build upon. 
A. BACKGROUND 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Medicare 
program was created through a compromise between the King-
Anderson bill supported by the Democratic party and Johnson 
Administration, and the Republican-supported Byrnes bill. 
The compromise produced a dual approach to health care 
insurance, Medicare, Part A, based on the Democratic 
proposal for hospital insurance, and Part B, based on the 
Republican proposal for physician services and outpatient 
drug coverage. During the compromise, the outpatient 
prescription drug benefits were removed. In lieu of 
outpatient prescription drugs being covered by Medicare, 
beneficiaries were offered coverage through a variety of 
supplemental plans ranging from employer-sponsored plans to 
Medicaid. 
B. STAKEHOLDER INTRODUCTION 
This section introduces stakeholders associated with 
legislation to create Medicare outpatient prescription drug 
benefits, and the traits that typify them. Stakeholders in 
the struggle for prescription drug benefits are numerous 
and varied. It is possible for an individual or group to 
32 
belong to more than one stakeholder classification. 
Summarizing the traits of each of the groups is difficult 
and necessarily inexact. That said, the stakeholders 
discussed here can be categorized into the following: the 
Administration, Congress, the political parties, and 
special interest groups. 
1. The Administration 
Members of the Administration with a stake in Medicare 
legislation include the President, his cabinet, and his 
political appointees. The views of the Administration 
change with the political party in control of the executive 
branch, as well as the individual elected president. 
a. Boards of Trustees for Medicare Trust Funds 
When Medicare was enacted in 1965, a separate 
Trust Fund with a separate Board of Trustees was created 
for both the Hospital Insurance and for the Supplemental 
Medical Insurance programs. 
(1) Membership. Of the seven members 
designated to be trustees for the two Boards, three of them 
are members of the President’s cabinet. The three cabinet 
members are the Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of 
Labor, and Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS). 
Also members are the presidential nominees (confirmed by 
the Senate), the Commissioner of Social Security, and the 
Administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS). The last two trustees are called public 
trustees. These individuals are also nominated by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate, but they cannot both 
be from the same political party, and they have four-year 
terms of service. 
(2) Responsibilities. The Board of Trustees 
is responsible for holding the trust funds, providing 
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annual reports to Congress each year on the current status 
and future estimates of the health of the trust funds, 
reviewing the policies followed to manage the trust funds 
and recommending any necessary changes, and reporting to 
Congress immediately if the amount in either trust fund is 
too small to finance current obligations (http: 
//www.ssa.gov/history/reports/trustees/historypt.html, 
August, 2004). 
b. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
The Office of Management and Budget assists the 
President by overseeing the preparation and administration 
of the federal budget. It helps formulate the President's 
spending plans and supervises budget implementation within 
the federal agencies. OMB also coordinates with the federal 
agencies to ensure reports, rules, testimony, and proposed 
legislation are consistent with the President's Budget and 
with Administration policies (http://www.whitehouse.gov 
/omb/organization/role.html, August, 2004). 
2. Congress 
This stakeholder category includes members of the 
House of Representatives, the Senate, particularly members 
of committees who hold a stake in the creation of relevant 
legislation, and the agencies that support Congress in the 
legislative process. Party majorities in Congress, 
committee chairmen, and ranking members change. The amount 
of control one chamber has compared to the other also 
varies, depending upon the issue and other variables. 
Democratic and Republican members of Congress are 
influenced by the President and his Administration, as well 




a. Committees and Subcommittees 
When efforts to reform and expand a program that 
has as large a government and fiscal footprint as Medicare 
are being considered, many committees and subcommittees in 
the House of Representatives and the Senate are involved in 
the drafting and approval of the necessary legislation. 
(1) The House of Representatives. The 
committees in the House of Representatives that have 
jurisdiction over Medicare legislation are the House Budget 
Committee, the Committee on Energy and Commerce-
Subcommittee on Health, and the House Ways and Means 
Committee—Subcommittee on Health. 
(2) The Senate. In the Senate, the 
committees that have jurisdiction include the Senate Budget 
Committee, the Senate Committee on Finance—Subcommittee on 
Health Care, and the Senate Committee on Health, Education, 
Labor, and Pensions. 
(3) Special and Joint Committees. There are 
also several special and joint committees that have a stake 
in a Medicare drug benefit. These committees are the Joint 
Economic Committee—Subcommittee on Health, the Joint 
Committee on Taxation, and the Senate Special Committee on 
Aging. 
b. Supporting Agencies 
Congress has many agencies that help them create 
and decide on legislation with economic and budget-related 
impacts. The Congressional Budget Office, Government 
Accountability Office, the Medicare Payment Advisory 
Committee (MedPAC), and the Congressional Research Service 
provide nonpartisan analyses, testimony, and reports that 
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assist Congress to make decisions impacting legislation and 
policy. 
(1) Congressional Budget Office (CBO). CBO’s 
mandate focuses mainly on economic and budget matters, and 
its products to Congress include baseline budget 
projections and economic forecasts, analyses of the 
President’s Budgets, analyses of long-term budgetary 
pressures and options for policy changes, and cost 
estimates for bills (http://www.cbo.gov/Mission.cfm, 
August, 2004). 
(2) Government Accountability Office (GAO). 
Formerly the General Accounting Office, and commonly called 
the investigative arm of Congress, GAO provides studies, 
testimony, and legal opinions to Congress on programs and 
expenditures of federal agencies. It studies how the 
federal government spends taxpayer dollars, and advises 
Congress and heads of executive agencies (such as Health 
and Human Services, HHS) about ways to make government more 
effective and responsive (http://www.gao.gov/about/what. 
html, August, 2004). 
(3) Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 
(MedPAC). MedPAC is an independent federal body established 
to advise Congress on issues affecting the Medicare 
program. It was established with the Balanced Budget Act of 
1997 in order to advise Congress on payments to private 
health plans participating in Medicare (Medicare + Choice) 
and providers in Medicare's traditional fee-for-service 
program. The MedPAC commissioners are appointed to three-
year terms by the Comptroller General and serve part time. 
The commission meets frequently with staff from 
congressional committees and the Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services (CMS), health care researchers, health 
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care providers, and beneficiary advocates to discuss policy 
issues.  It formulates its recommendations for Congress in 
two reports issued in March and June each year. 
(4) Congressional Research Service (CRS). 
The CRS researches public policy exclusively and directly 
for members of Congress, its Committees, and staffs on a 
confidential basis. CRS provides Congress with analysis, 
research, and information to help contribute to the 
legislative process (Congressional Research Service [CRS], 
2002, pp.4-5). 
3. The Political Parties 
Political ideology and party positions change over 
time, so making generalizations about either is 
problematic. Most importantly, politicians are individuals 
who reflect a wide range of opinions; thus, a particular 
elected official will not necessarily fit neatly into any 
single set of categories. The United States has, 
traditionally, maintained two main political parties, the 
Democratic and Republican parties. Generally speaking, 
Democrats advocate a more liberal position while 
Republicans support a more conservative platform 
(http://www.balancedpolitics.org, August, 2004). 
a. Democrats 
A classically liberal platform favors economic 
activism by the government that includes, among other 
things, protection of the environment and consumers. In 
social affairs, liberals are inclined to oppose government 
intervention. Modern liberalism has the same premise as the 
classic ideology, but differs in that it favors government 
action to end discrimination, reduce poverty, provide 
health care for all citizens, and allow an education for 
everyone. Modern liberalism also considers it the 
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responsibility of the government to limit extreme 
inequalities of income (http://www.socialstudieshelp.com, 
August, 2004). The Medicare Program has been a traditional 
theme of the Democratic party because it falls under the 
platform of providing health care for all retired and 
disabled people through a large government-controlled 
organization. 
b. Republicans 
A classic conservative favors a limited 
government role in the economy which includes low taxation 
and minimum regulation. Modern conservatism believes in 
free market capitalism. Although not completely opposed to 
the Medicare Program, the Republicans support private party 
administration of the program, and forms of competition 
that they believe foster lower health care costs. 
4. Special Interest Groups 
Special interest groups represent a range of points of 
view and concerns. They may be linked to political parties 
or they may be nonpartisan, profit-driven or nonprofit, 
privately funded, government funded, or funded by 
educational institutes. Invariably, interest groups attempt 
to influence policy through several methods, but mainly by 
supplying public officials with things they want. These 
things include credible information, public support, and 
financial support. 
Information provided by interest groups may help a 
legislator take and support a position on an issue. On 
highly visible issues, an interest group can raise support 
from its members to help with public support for proposed 
legislation (http://www.socialstudieshelp.com, Aug, 2004). 
Interest groups help finance election campaigns through 
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political action committees or soft money donations, lobby 
Congress for their members’ interests, and occasionally 
provide jobs to former government officials. 
Interest groups often raise money through foundation 
grants, federal grants, membership dues, and private 
industry donations to help obtain their goals on Capitol 
Hill. Obviously, special interest groups are not 
necessarily objective, and their motives may be hidden, 
especially if their goal is to influence public policy. The 
tangled web of special interest groups identified in this 
chapter is comprised of those that have a stake of some 
kind in Medicare prescription drug legislation related to 
Medicare beneficiaries or retirees, the health insurance 
industry, pharmaceutical companies or research foundations. 
a. Membership Groups 
A large government program such as Medicare 
promotes the creation of interest groups through the 
memberships of senior citizens and beneficiaries. The 
beneficiaries have an incentive to use groups to help 
protect and organize expansions to their current benefits. 
Two special interest groups that claim representation for 
senior citizens and have been active in the Medicare 
prescription drug legislation include AARP, the Alliance 
for Retired Americans (ARA), and Families USA. 
(1) AARP. AARP is a nonpartisan, nonprofit 
organization of 35 million Americans age 50 and older. 
Formerly known as American Association for Retired Persons, 
it shortened its name to simply the abbreviation “AARP” to 
better represent its non-retired members. The AARP mission 
statement reads: "AARP is dedicated to enhancing quality of 
life for all as we age. We lead positive social change and 
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deliver value to members through information, advocacy and 
service" (http://www.aarp.org/leadership/Articles/a2002-12-
18-aarpmission.html, August, 2004). AARP has two affiliated 
groups under its organization, the AARP foundation and AARP 
Services, Inc (ASI). 
The AARP foundation is a charity group with 
a mission to: “provide security, protection and empowerment 
for older persons in need” (http://www.aarp.org/foundation-
about/Articles/a2002-12-03-background.html, August, 2004). 
It sponsors programs such as litigation support, Tax-Aide, 
the Senior Community Service Employment Program (SCSEP) and 
the Money Management Program.  
ASI is a for-profit, wholly owned subsidiary 
of AARP. A wholly owned subsidiary is one whose stock is 
owned by the parent organization. ASI manages a range of 
products and services available to AARP members, provides 
marketing services to AARP and its member service 
providers, and manages the AARP website. ASI provides a 
range of insurance products, including supplemental 
Medicare, supplemental hospital, long-term care, 
automobile, homeowners, and life insurance. It also 
provides pharmacy services such as prescription drug and 
medical supply discount programs, eye-health services, and 
eyewear products (http://www.aarp.org/leadership-executives 
/Articles/a2003-01-27-sweeney.html, August, 2004). 
(2) Alliance for Retired Americans. 
Established in May of 2001, the ARA “aims to influence 
government through action on retiree legislative and 
political issues at the federal, state and local levels” 
(http://www.retiredamericans.org/index.php?tg=articles&topi
cs=1&new=0&newc=0, August, 2004). The ARA was created by 
the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
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Organizations (AFL-CIO), a voluntary federation of 60 
national and international labor unions. The ARA offers 
members health insurance coverage to supplement Medicare 
[http://www.araretireehealth.com, August, 2004]. These 
member services and benefits are offered through Union 
Plus® health insurance programs, offered by Union Privilege 
which was created by AFL-CIO in 1986. 
(3) Families USA. This organization is a 
national nonprofit, non-partisan organization that has been 
a voice for health care consumers for over 20 years. Among 
its many functions it manages a network of organizations 
and individuals that works for the consumer perspective 
in national and state health policy debates, acts as a 
watchdog over government actions affecting health care, 
alerts consumers to changes, produces health policy reports 
that describe problems facing health care consumers, and 
conducts public information campaigns about the concerns of 
health care consumers (http://www.familiesusa.org/site/ 
PageServer?pagename=AboutUs, August, 2004). 
(4) Alliance for Health Reform. This is a 
nonpartisan, nonprofit group that “believes that all in the 
U.S. should have health coverage at a reasonable cost” 
(http://www.allhealth.org/mission.asp, August, 2004). The 
Alliance claims it does not lobby for particular 
legislation, but provides unbiased information for policy 
makers “so they can understand the roots of the nation's 
health care problems and the trade-offs posed by competing 
proposals for change” (http://www.allhealth.org/mission 
.asp, August, 2004). The chairman of the Alliance’s board 
of directors is Senator Jay Rockefeller, a Republican from 
West Virginia. The vice chairman of the board is Senator 
Bill Frist, a Republican from Tennessee, and a heart and 
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lung transplant surgeon. Other members of their board 
include leaders from the fields of medicine, labor, 
consumer advocacy and public interest. 
b. Health Care Industry Groups 
The health care industry, mainly health insurers, 
are especially concerned about government regulations for 
the delivery of Medicare services by the private sector, as 
well as the formularies that will be used to decide their 
payment schedules. In the past, the health insurers have 
learned that government regulations can make providing 
health care coverage to seniors too complex, and ultimately 
not worth the effort. Groups that have been formed to look 
out for their interests include America’s Health Insurance 
Plans (AHIP) and Pharmaceutical Care Management Association 
(PCMA). 
(1) America’s Health Insurance Plans. AHIP 
is “the national association representing nearly 1,300 
member companies that provide health insurance coverage to 
more than 200 million Americans” (http://www.ahip.org/ 
content/default.aspx?bc=31, August, 2004). Its member 
companies offer medical expense, long-term care, disability 
income, dental, supplemental, and stop-loss insurance to 
consumers, employers, and public purchasers. Their goal is 
“to provide a unified voice for the health care financing 
industry, to expand access to high quality, cost effective 
health care to all Americans, and to ensure Americans’ 
financial security through robust insurance markets, 
product flexibility and innovation, and an abundance of 
consumer choice” (http://www.ahip.org/content/default. 
aspx?bc=31, August, 2004). 
(2) Pharmaceutical Care Management 
Association. PCMA represents Pharmaceutical Benefit 
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Managers (PBMs). This group is “dedicated to enhancing the 
proven tools and techniques that PBMs have pioneered in the 
marketplace and works to lower the cost of prescription 
drugs for more than 200 million Americans” (http://www 
pcmanet.org/about_pcma.asp, August, 2004). As introduced in 
the previous chapter, PBMs are being widely used by many 
private health plans to provide drug benefits and save the 
plans money. PBMs are one method considered by drafters of 
Medicare prescription drug benefits to be able to contain 
costs. Many Federal Employee Health Benefit plans use PBMs 
for this reason. 
c. Pharmaceutical Groups 
The pharmaceutical industry has learned from the 
same experiences as the health insurers. Their interest in 
the prescription drug legislation is based upon the impact 
of government regulations governing the process for 
introducing generic drugs and their ability to extend 
patents on their brand-name drugs. Another possible impact 
is allowing the purchase and importation of drugs from 
other countries where they are less expensive than the 
United States. 
One group that the pharmaceutical companies 
formed to look after their interests is the Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America. There has also been 
controversy regarding the use of “front” groups by the 
pharmaceutical industry, two of which are the United 
Seniors Association (USA), and The Seniors Coalition (TSC). 
(1) Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA). PhRMA represents leading 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, which also 
devote efforts to research and development of new drugs. 
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PhRMA’s mission is “to conduct effective advocacy for 
public policies that encourage discovery of important new 
medicines for patients by pharmaceutical/biotechnology 
research companies” (http://www.phrma.org/whoweare/, 
August, 2004). The Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America Foundation, a subsidiary of PhRMA, 
is a non-profit organization. It provides funding for 
research and for the education and training of scientists 
and physicians who have selected pharmacology, 
pharmaceutics, toxicology, informatics or health outcomes 
as a career choice. 
(2) United Seniors Association (USA). This 
organization has been identified as a “front” for the 
pharmaceutical industry by AARP and Congressional “watch 
dog” Public Citizen. It claims to work “to expand 
investment and retirement freedom, health freedom, tax 
freedom, national security and economic freedom for 
American families, their children, grandchildren, and great 
grandchildren” and calls itself a nonprofit nonpartisan 
organization under section 501(c)(4) of the Internal 
Revenue Code. The disclaimer on its website says that 
“because USA lobbies on behalf of American Families, 
contributions are not tax deductible for tax purposes” 
(http://www.usanext.org, August, 2004). 
(3) The Seniors Coalition (TSC). The Seniors 
Coalition is also a “non-profit, 501c(4), non-partisan, 
education and issue advocacy organization that represents 
the interests and concerns of America's senior citizens” 
(http://www.senior.org/bin/view.fpl/10142/article/327/cms_a
rticle/327.html, August, 2004). Their goal is to “protect 
the quality of life and economic well-being that older 
Americans have earned while supporting common sense 
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solutions to the challenges of the future” (http://www. 
senior.org, August, 2004). 
d. Research Foundations 
Research foundations can receive their financial 
support through various means, including government grants, 
foundation grants, private industry, or individual 
donations. The research groups that will be discussed here 
are frequently used for credible information regarding the 
Medicare program and the prescription drug benefit. 
(1) Kaiser Family Foundation. The Henry J. 
Kaiser Family Foundation is a non-profit, private operating 
foundation that focuses on major health care issues facing 
the country (http://www.kff.org/about/index.cfm, August, 
2004). The foundation provides facts and analysis for 
policymakers, the media, the health care community, and the 
general public. The Kaiser foundation has conducted 
research and analysis on several Medicare policy issues, 
including the addition of a Medicare prescription drug 
benefit, and has produced fact sheets, resource books and 
reports for policy discussions. 
(2) The Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities. This organization conducts research and 
analysis on proposed budget and tax policies to ensure that 
the needs of low-income families and individuals are 
considered in public debates. It also examines the short- 
and long-term impacts of proposed policies on the health of 
the economy and on the soundness of the budgets 
(http://www.cbpp.org/info.html, August, 2004). 
(3) The Urban Institute. The Urban Institute 
is a nonprofit nonpartisan policy research and educational 
organization that studies social, economic, and governance 
problems facing the nation. It provides information to 
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public and private decision makers to help address 
challenges, and strives to raise citizen understanding of 
the issues and tradeoffs in policy making. Funding for 
Urban Institute projects comes from government agencies, 
foundations, and private institutions. The Health Policy 
Center at the Urban Institute studies how the dynamics of 
the health care market affect health care financing, costs, 
and access (http://www.urban.org/content/About/Mission/ 
mission_081701.htm, August, 2004). 
(4) Health Strategies. Health Strategies is 
a strategic consulting firm for the health care technology 
industry, government agencies, and medical foundations. 
They “operate as a cross between a think tank and a top 
management consulting shop” and “provide access to highly 
specialized research that is tailored to the confidential 
strategic needs” of their diverse customer base 
(http://www.healthstrategies.net/about/index.html, August, 
2004). According to its website, the firm provides 
strategic guidance on policy issues, but does not lobby 
Congress or the Administration, and firm members are not 
registered lobbyists. 
C. ATTEMPTS TO CREATE PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFITS 
Since Medicare was enacted in 1965, several attempts 
have been made by the President and Congress to add 
outpatient prescription drug coverage to the benefits. This 
section will summarize the major efforts at adding a drug 
benefit to Medicare prior to 2003. Table 3.1 summarizes the 
benefits of the major prescription drug legislation. 
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Table 3.1. Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit 
Proposals, 1988-2002. 
 
1. Task Force on Prescription Drugs, 1967 
Since its creation, Part A of Medicare covered all in-
hospital prescription drug use and Part B of Medicare 
covered any prescription drugs that were dispensed in 
physicians’ offices. 
In 1967, the Secretary of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW) established the Task Force on Prescription 
Drugs to examine the issues involved with adding a 
prescription drug benefit to Medicare Part B. The task 
force considered five main issues, most of which were still 
valid in 2003 when policymakers succeeded in passing 
legislation to add a prescription drug benefit to Medicare. 
The issues they considered were: the prices of prescription 
drugs, the formularies for pricing the coverage, 
prescription drug utilization, design of the cost-share 
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with beneficiaries, and pharmacy reimbursement (Oliver, et 
al., p.294). 
In its final report on 02 February 1969, the task 
force announced that elderly Americans needed a Medicare 
drug insurance program, and that providing such a benefit 
was possible economically. After the task force’s report 
was submitted, Nixon’s HEW Secretary, Robert Finch, formed 
a committee to review its recommendations. The committee 
agreed with the findings of the task force, and asked the 
Secretary to endorse the recommendation for a prescription 
drug benefit to President Nixon. However, Secretary Finch 
did not endorse the recommendation. Measures to provide 
coverage were proposed in Congress, but the only result was 
expansion of Medicare eligibility to include the disabled 
and those with end-stage renal disease in 1972 (Oliver et 
al., p.294). 
The addition of these new beneficiaries to the 
Medicare program also added a large entitlement for Part B 
coverage of physician-administered drugs that were 
especially common among dialysis patients. After this 
expansion, more and more drugs were added to the list of 
approved drugs covered by Part B, including those used to 
treat cancer. The skyrocketing costs to the Medicare 
program of these drugs were one reason legislators 
revisited a Medicare prescription drug benefit. 
2. The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act, 1988 
The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act (MCCA) of 1988 
was the first major legislation to change Medicare since 
the 1972 expansion. It was also one of the most 
controversial and short-lived changes to Medicare. 
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The initial proposal by Health and Human Services 
Secretary Otis Bowen was an effort to provide seniors with 
protection from catastrophic medical costs, and alleviate 
gaps in Medicare’s hospital coverage while lowering 
seniors’ out-of-pocket expenses on hospital and physician 
services. One boundary condition provided by President 
Ronald Reagan was that the legislation had to remain budget 
neutral. No additional financing would come from the 
general tax fund. 
The Republicans in Congress created the initial 
legislation, and a prescription drug benefit was added by 
the Democrats. In fact, AARP offered their endorsement of 
the legislation only if it provided prescription drug 
coverage. On the other hand, the Reagan Administration 
threatened to veto the bill if the drug benefit was 
included in it, and the pharmaceutical manufacturers spent 
three million dollars on a campaign to overturn the 
prescription drug proposal. The threat of a veto diminished 
after the Iran-Contra scandal made it unappealing for the 
Reagan Administration to fight against an expansion of a 
highly visible social program. It was in 1989 that The 
Seniors Coalition was formed to fight to repeal the MCCA. 
As mentioned previously, this special interest group 
receives most of its funding from the pharmaceutical 
companies. 
Of course, the fact that it included a prescription 
drug benefit was not the most significant problem with the 
MCCA; the most controversial part was that the new benefits 
would be financed by beneficiaries. Beneficiary financing 
was included to meet the budget neutral criterion set by 
the Reagan Administration. The financing proposed for these 
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added benefits marked a turning point in Medicare policy, 
and how lawmakers considered Medicare. The MCCA proposed an 
increase in seniors’ premiums based on their incomes. In 
the end, the new benefits proposed by the MCCA were largely 
financed by middle- and upper-income beneficiaries. 
Enacted in June of 1988, it was repealed 17 months 
later, due to controversy and opposition from senior 
citizens and lobby groups regarding its means-tested 
financing and lack of adequate long-term care. 
3. The Health Security Act, 1993 
This proposal by the Clinton Administration was an 
attempt at a complete overhaul of the American health care 
system, not only Medicare. The plan called for 
comprehensive health care for all Americans, and added 
prescription drug coverage in the proposed plan, as well as 
Medicare. 
To address the costs of the new prescription drug 
benefit, the government, especially Medicare, would use its 
large purchase volume to negotiate discounts from the 
pharmaceutical companies. The other idea to contain the 
costs was to make the health plans compete for business to 
make them more efficient and responsive to beneficiaries’ 
needs. 
The government’s purchasing power would incorporate 
rebate agreements signed by pharmaceutical companies for 
brand-name drugs for a discount of at least 17 percent off 
average retail prices. If the drug companies raised a drug 
price at a rate greater than inflation, the government 
would get an added rebate. Another effort to control prices 
required that only generic drugs, if they existed, to be 
authorized through the program unless there was a clinical 
50 
reason for brand-name use. The mandate on generic 
pharmaceutical use had been part of the regulations for 
Medicaid and Medicare’s in-hospital and physician-dispensed 
drug program since 1973 when HEW Secretary Caspar 
Weinberger made it a requirement. The pharmaceutical 
industry opposed the Health Security Act due to its fears 
that a large government-controlled prescription drug 
benefit would result in overbearing regulations on industry 
practices and price controls, as occurred in the 1970s. 
In the end, the Clinton administration was unable to 
capitalize on Democratic control of the House and Senate, 
and all proposals at national health care reform failed to 
pass through Congress. Although not entirely related to the 
prescription drug benefit, the failure was due to a lack of 
support from Republicans and special interest groups. 
4. The Balanced Budget Act, 1997 
Signed into law by President Clinton in August, 1997, 
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 was intended to reduce the 
budget deficit. The Balanced Budget Act also made changes 
to Medicare. The current and future costs of the Medicare 
program were a growing concern of the administration and 
lawmakers. The changes made by the Balanced Budget Act were 
a significant impact on the 30-year-old program. 
The Balanced Budget Act proposed cuts in Medicare 
spending by $115 billion over five years and $385 billion 
over ten years. The reason the cuts in Medicare spending 
were deemed possible was because of the amount that would 
be saved through the new policies created in the Balanced 
Budget Act, namely Medicare Part C, Medicare medical 
savings accounts, changes in payment policies and formulas 
for providers and health plans, efforts to crack down on 
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fraud and abuse by Medicare providers, and the formation of 
the National Bipartisan Commission on the Future of 
Medicare. All of these efforts were intended to save money 
in the Medicare program in the long-term. 
a. Medicare + Choice 
The newly created Medicare Part C, or Medicare + 
Choice managed care plan, encouraged beneficiaries to 
switch from the traditional fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare 
to health maintenance organizations (HMOs) or preferred 
provider organizations (PPOs). The government and 
beneficiaries would pay Medicare premiums to insurance 
plans to deliver Part A and Part B services. The plans also 
offered prescription drug benefits to beneficiaries, a very 
desirable benefit for seniors. At its peak in 1999, Part C 
enrolled 6.3 million beneficiaries, or about 16 percent. 
Enrollment in Part C began to decrease, and beneficiaries 
returned to FFS, when the number of available managed care 
plans began to drop and insurers raised co-pays and cut 
benefits. In 2003, the number of beneficiaries enrolled in 
private plans had dropped to 4.6 million, or 11 percent of 
beneficiaries. The managed care plans were not generating 
as much revenue because the government would only pay 
certain premium amounts, and the HMOs and PPOs were losing 
profits. 
b. The National Bipartisan Commission on the 
Future of Medicare 
The creation of the 17-member National Bipartisan 
Commission on the Future of Medicare was also a milestone 
in the Medicare program. The Commission’s co-chairs were 
Senator John Breaux (D-La.) and Representative Bill Thomas 
(R-Cal.). It was tasked with studying the main issues of 
Medicare and providing recommendations for reform. When the 
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commission concluded its studies in March of 1999, its key 
findings were: to switch to a system of premium support, to 
raise the eligibility age from 65 to 67, to increase co-
payments, and to add a prescription drug benefit. The drug 
coverage that the commission recommended, however, had many 
limitations and problematic financing, including little 
relief for lower-income beneficiaries who could not afford 
the larger premiums required to finance the benefit.  
The recommendations of the commission did not 
receive the requisite 11 of 17 votes in order for the 
report to be binding on Congress. The addition of the 
prescription drug benefit was a last-ditch effort to gain 
one more vote, but the remaining six voters held their 
votes back due to an underlying failure to find a 
compromise among the beneficiaries, providers, and 
insurance plans. 
The efforts to reduce fraud and the payment 
reforms that stemmed from the Balanced Budget Act, along 
with a prosperous economy that created budget surpluses 
between 1998 and 2001, gave the Medicare program a break 
from the pending doom of insolvency. However, the idea of 
filling Medicare’s financial gaps and adding a prescription 
drug benefit, spurred the introduction of numerous bills 
for consideration by Congress. The next section discusses 
the Medicare reform bills that were significant, yet still 
failed to go the distance. 
5. Medicare Rx 2000 Act 
The Medicare Rx 2000 Act was introduced by National 
Bipartisan Commission co-chair Bill Thomas, and passed in 
the House of Representatives by a vote of 217-214 on June 
28, 2000. The bill was largely supported by the Republican 
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side of the aisle. There were only five Democratic and one 
Independent vote in favor of the bill, and ten Republican 
and one Independent vote against the bill. The bill was 
sent to the Senate, but it died without consideration. Its 
Medicare prescription drug provisions included a deductible 
of $250, co-payment of 50 percent up to $2100 in total drug 
expenditures, and catastrophic stop-loss after 
participants’ out-of-pocket drug costs exceeded $6,000 
after which Medicare would cover 100 percent. Low-income 
subsidies would be available for beneficiaries with incomes 
lower than 150 percent of poverty, and additional help 
would be available for those whose incomes fell under 135 
percent of poverty. 
6. Senate and House Proposals, 2001 
In 2001 there were six attempts at Medicare 
prescription drug legislation in both the House and the 
Senate. The six House bills did not move past the two 
subcommittees on Health. The six Senate bills did not move 
past the Senate Finance committee. After the Economic 
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act was enacted in 
mid-2001, and Vermont Senator Jeffords changed parties from 
Republican to Independent, the Democrats briefly held 
control of the Senate. The Democrats tried six different 
variations of Medicare prescription drug bills, but they 
all stalled in committee. 
7. Medicare Modernization and Prescription Drug Act 
of 2002 
The Senate and House of Representatives once again 
attempted to pass legislation for a Medicare prescription 
drug benefit in 2002. Three bills were introduced in the 
Senate, but they only made it as far as the Committee on 
Finance because the Senate had failed to pass a budget for 
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fiscal year 2003, and they could not exceed the $350 
billion limit in the previous year’s budget resolution. 
Nine bills were introduced in the House, and one passed the 
House on June 28th. The bill was another Republican-
supported bill, sponsored by Representative Nancy Johnson 
(R-Tex.), and it passed with a vote of 221-208. There were 
only eight Democrats and one Independent voting in favor of 
the bill, and eight Republicans and one Independent opposed 
to the bill. 
The bill proposed a voluntary enrollment in Medicare 
Part D with a $250 deductible. Cost-sharing would require 
the private prescription drug insurers to cover 80 percent 
of enrollees’ drug costs from $251 to $1,000, then 50 
percent between $1,001 and the initial coverage limit of 
$2,000. Enrollees would cover all costs between $2,001 and 
$4900, and Medicare would cover the entire cost once the 
beneficiary reached the $3,800 out-of-pocket limit. 
Premiums would be determined by the HHS, estimated at $35 
per month, and subsidies would be available for 
beneficiaries with incomes below 175 percent of poverty. 
D. FRAMEWORK TO MODERNIZE AND IMPROVE MEDICARE 
The reform of Medicare to include outpatient 
prescription drug coverage was a high priority for the Bush 
administration in 2003. After dozens of attempts in 
Congress to pass legislation for drug coverage under 
Medicare over the previous years, President Bush provided a 
framework from which Congress could begin to draft 
legislation that met the administration’s guidelines for 
approval. 
The President committed $400 billion over ten years in 
his fiscal year 2004 budget to modernize and improve 
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Medicare. The framework called for a prescription drug 
benefit, a choice of health care plan for beneficiaries, a 
choice of doctor, hospital, or treatment location for 
beneficiaries, full coverage for disease prevention such as 
cancer, diabetes, and osteoporosis screenings, and 
protection from high out-of-pocket costs (Executive Office 
of the President of the United States, March, 2003). 
Seniors would be able to get immediate discounts with a 
drug discount card that would be available in 2004, and 
low-income beneficiaries would receive assistance with 
premiums and cost-sharing, as well as a $600 annual subsidy 
for drug coverage. There would be three basic options 
available to beneficiaries: traditional Medicare, enhanced 
Medicare, and Medicare advantage. 
1. Traditional Medicare 
The first option available to beneficiaries would 
include continued enrollment in the traditional Medicare 
system. These beneficiaries would receive a discount drug 
card to save them up to 25 percent on the costs of 
prescription drugs and protection from high out-of-pocket 
costs. These added benefits would not increase their 
current premiums. 
2. Enhanced Medicare 
This option would give seniors health care choices 
through multiple health care plans. The plans would offer 
prescription drug benefits, full coverage of preventive 
benefits, protection against high out-of-pocket drug 
spending, and cost sharing that would not penalize 
beneficiaries who need access to more expensive medical 
care. Those enrolled in this option would be able to choose 
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any doctor or medical treatment facility they wanted for 
their care. 
3. Medicare Advantage 
This option is similar to Medicare + Choice. Seniors 
would have the option of low-cost, high-coverage managed 
care plans. Costs of the Advantage plans would vary based 
on the coverage selected by the beneficiary. Some plans 
would require no premium payments while others may have 
extra benefits that require additional premiums. 
Beneficiaries could opt out of drug coverage through these 
plans if they already have coverage through another source. 
These plans would also offer subsidies for low-income 
seniors. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced the various stakeholders of 
the Medicare prescription drug legislation, their points of 
view and general positions on such legislation. It also 
discussed attempts to add outpatient prescription drug 
benefits to Medicare between 1967 and 2003. Finally, it 
introduced President Bush’s Medicare reform proposal 
submitted to Congress in 2003. 
The next chapter is dedicated to the Medicare 
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 
2003. It discusses the various bills introduced in the 
House and the Senate, compares the bills that passed each 
chamber and discusses the major differences between the 
House and Senate versions. It also compares the Senate and 
House versions as it relates to the views of each political 
party. Next the chapter introduces the major issues 
negotiated between the two bills, how testimony from 
various stakeholders impacted negotiations, and how a 
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compromise was reached. Finally, the Medicare prescription 
drug legislation was the subject of controversy, and the 
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IV. MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND 
MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this chapter is the Medicare Prescription 
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, signed 
into law (Public Law 108-173) by President George W. Bush 
on December 8, 2003. It will discuss the bills introduced 
in the House and the Senate in 2003, report the process 
that the bills followed in each chamber, and compare them. 
Next to be introduced are the major issues that were 
negotiated between the two bills and how testimony from 
various stakeholders impacted negotiations. Then the 
results of the compromises that were finally reached will 
be reported, followed by some of the controversy 
surrounding the bill. A chronology of the major events 
associated with the Medicare legislation is available in 
the Appendix. 
B. BEGINNING OF LEGISLATION IN 2003 
On January 28th, in his State of the Union address, 
President Bush announced that he wanted Congress to 
modernize Medicare and create a prescription drug benefit 
for its beneficiaries. On February 3rd he sent Congress his 
budget proposal for fiscal year 2004, requesting $400 
billion over ten years for Medicare modernization including 
protection against catastrophic costs, better private 
options for all beneficiaries, and prescription drug 
coverage. The president’s proposed budget for Medicare 
modernization is shown in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1. President’s FY04 Budget Proposal for 
Medicare Modernization (From OMB, 2003, p. 123). 
 
1. Political Outlook in 2003 
Although Congress had been unable to pass legislation 
for a Medicare drug benefit in recent years, the optimism 
for accomplishing this in 2003 was high. There were several 
reasons this legislative year could be different. The first 
was that Republicans had majorities in both the House and 
the Senate after the 2002 elections, and they also 
controlled the White House. The second reason was that the 
2004 election year was around the corner, and the 
visibility of the Medicare legislation would likely earn 
the 2004 candidates votes, if Congress was successful on 
this issue. The third reason the outlook was good for a 
drug benefit in 2003 was that many lawmakers were aware 
that the federal deficit was growing, and a $400 billion 
offer to create the benefit may not be available again in 
the near future. All of these reasons made compromise 
possible by lawmakers who would otherwise be unwilling to 
yield their long-held ideals of what kind of coverage the 
legislation should or should not provide to seniors, and 
how it should be administered. 
2. Reaction of Congress 
On March 4th, President Bush provided the framework for 
Medicare introduced in the previous chapter. However, the 
framework did not satisfy most lawmakers. Many in Congress 
felt that the President’s goals of major reform while 
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creating a drug benefit were too lofty. Many were of the 
opinion that the best possible outcome would be a 
prescription drug benefit for the lower income Medicare 
beneficiaries. Each party in the House and the Senate had 
concerns that would end up as major sticking points for 
compromise during committee conferences later in the year. 
a. Democratic Concerns 
While many stakeholders conceded that a drug 
benefit for low-income seniors would be a step in the right 
direction, most Democrats were opposed to this line of 
thinking. The main problem was that Democrats supported a 
drug benefit that would be available for ALL beneficiaries. 
They felt that basing the benefit on incomes went against 
the premise of Medicare. Means-testing was a tool that 
Medicaid used to ensure that low-income Americans were 
given basic health care. Medicare, on the other hand, was 
for all Americans aged 65 and older, as well as some under 
age 65 who were disabled, regardless of income. Many were 
also afraid that targeted benefits to the poor might 
alienate the middle-class and more affluent voters who 
continued to finance the system thru their payroll taxes. 
The outcome could be similar to what happened with the MCCA 
of 1988. Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) opined that some 
states would also oppose a Medicare benefit that would 
subsidize the low-income because they already had similar 
benefits available to the poor (Adams, 2003, p.999). 
Another concern of the Democrats was that the 
drug coverage proposed by the administration for seniors 
who wanted to remain in traditional fee-for-service 
Medicare would not be adequate. They would be forced to 
seek a plan with a more robust drug benefit which may not 
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be advantageous to them in the long-run, due to 
availability in their market areas. Most Democrats were not 
completely opposed to privately managed plans, but thought 
beneficiaries should have adequate drug coverage in any 
plan they chose. Of course, they also admitted that a plan 
such as the one they favored could cost $500 billion more 
than the $400 billion that was proposed by the Republicans. 
b. Republican Concerns 
The House Republicans had been especially 
successful at passing bills for Medicare outpatient drugs 
in 2000 and 2002, although they never made it through the 
more closely divided Senate (Carey, 2004, p.238). They were 
certain that this year they could reach a consensus in the 
House once again, and knew that another failure in the 
Senate would reflect poorly on the leadership in both 
chambers, and the White House. 
The basic desire of Republicans was to use 
private health care managers for Medicare and the 
prescription drug benefit on the theory that they would be 
cost efficient because of competition; however, even the 
most active Republicans in the House and the Senate agreed 
with the Democrats who believed adequate coverage also had 
to be available in a non-privately managed plan. Senate 
Majority Leader, Bill Frist (R-Tenn.), the Senate’s only 
physician and long-time advocate of a Medicare prescription 
drug benefit, and Senate Finance Committee Chairman Charles 
Grassley (R-Iowa), who sponsored many bills aimed at low-
income beneficiaries, were two such members. Frist and 
Grassley both argued against recreating a situation that 
happened to many seniors enrolled in Medicare + Choice. 
Seniors, especially those in rural areas, were forced out 
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of privately run Medicare + Choice plans when private 
insurers left Medicare due to low government reimbursements 
and excessive costs that dipped into their profits (Carey, 
2003, p.563). The government was forced to provide 
subsidies to many private plans in order to entice them to 
continue to offer benefits to Medicare beneficiaries. Most 
plans dropped some of the very benefits, such as 
prescription drug coverage, that drew seniors to the plans 
in the first place. 
Fiscal conservatives wanted to include reform 
measures that would defray the costs of added drug 
benefits. Other Republicans supported the idea of “targeted 
relief” (Carey, 2003, p.563) for seniors without 
prescription drug coverage who could not afford their 
drugs. They felt that a universal drug benefit would not be 
able to fit within the $400 billion bottom line. This is 
what the Democrats felt undermined the universal nature of 
the Medicare program. Many stakeholders, such as Families 
USA, thought that if everything else failed, the common 
ground could be a drug benefit for low-income seniors 
(Adams, 2003, p.999). 
c. Bipartisan Issues 
Both parties were concerned about three universal 
issues pertaining to Medicare and the drug benefit. First 
was the growing costs of the Medicare program even without 
the addition of a prescription drug benefit, the second was 
the pervasive “doughnut hole” in coverage characteristic of 
most current proposals, and third was the possibility of 
“employer crowd-out” (Carey, 2003, pp.563, 1358). 
In 2003, the Office of Management and Budget 
estimated that Medicare spending in the traditional program 
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would rise from $230.9 billion in 2002 to $349.4 billion by 
fiscal year 2008, a 51 percent increase. The forecast for 
total federal expenditures during the same period of time 
was only a 35 percent overall increase. This meant that 
even without the prescription drug benefit, Medicare 
spending was growing at a rate exceeding all other federal 
spending, and would take an increased share of the total 
federal budget and account for a larger percentage of the 
annual GDP. The majority of this increase was due to the 
influence of the retirement of the baby boomers. 
The two House-passed bills and most proposals had 
gaps in coverage embedded in the drug benefit. Many 
lawmakers opposed large out-of-pocket costs for seniors, 
but others saw it as a necessity if benefits were 
universal, not targeted to low-income beneficiaries. The 
questions in 2003 were how large the gaps would be. Would 
beneficiaries have to pay monthly premiums even though they 
were in the middle of a coverage gap? And, what would the 
maximum out-of-pocket costs be to beneficiaries? 
The issue of employer crowd-out is more difficult 
to estimate. It is thought that it would be more likely as 
more beneficiaries were included in the Medicare drug 
coverage. Employers facing financial difficulties may 
decide to cut costs by abandoning drug coverage for their 
retirees, thereby making the costs of administering a drug 
benefit even more expensive for the federal government. 
Policymakers could try to add incentives for employers to 
maintain coverage, perhaps by giving companies a subsidy to 
help them continue to provide the benefit. But the ongoing 
economic slump and lower corporate earnings could prompt 
companies to curtail or drop retiree health care coverage 
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if they knew that those retirees were eligible for it 
elsewhere (Carey, 2003, pp.563, 1358). 
As the 108th Congress began, Republicans and 
Democrats sorted through their respective positions. 
Lawmakers on both sides agreed on some issues and differed 
on others. Some in both parties viewed the overhaul efforts 
as a first step toward broader changes. Democrats saw it as 
a first step toward expanded benefits. Republicans saw it 
as a first step toward additional privatization. Both sides 
saw the “first-step” argument as justification for the 
compromises they were willing to make in order to see the 
benefit through the House and Senate (Carey, 2003, p.1358). 
C. THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET RESOLUTION 
As had many presidential budgets before it, the 2004 
budget request by President Bush put money on the table for 
a Medicare prescription drug benefit. The 2001 Clinton 
budget had a proposal of $100 billion, the 2002 Bush budget 
proposed an amount of $153 billion, and the 2003 budget had 
an amount of $190 billion, all for the purpose of adding a 
prescription drug benefit to Medicare. The request by the 
President for $400 billion to Congress for this purpose was 
the largest amount proposed to date, and marked the 
beginning of the process for passage of legislation to 
provide the new benefit. 
1. The House and Senate Budget Committees 
After receiving the President’s budget request, the 
two Budget Committees began receiving testimony from 
various cabinet members and expert witnesses on the fiscal 
year 2004 budget in their respective chambers. The Director 
of the Office of Management and Budget and the Secretary of 
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the Health and Human Services both provided testimony 
regarding the Medicare prescription drug benefit. 
a. Senate Actions 
On March 12th the Senate Budget Committee began to 
consider and mark up The Concurrent Resolution on the 
Budget for FY 2004, S.Con.Res. 23. On March 26th the Senate 
adopted its version of the budget resolution, by a vote of 
56-44. The resolution established a reserve fund of up to 
$400 billion for FY 2004 through 2013 for legislation that 
would reform Medicare and improve the access of 
beneficiaries to prescription drugs or promote geographic 
equity payments. 
b. House Actions 
On March 12th the House Budget Committee began 
mark up and consideration of The Concurrent Resolution on 
the Budget for FY 2004, H.Con.Res 95. On March 21st the 
House agreed to the resolution by a vote of 215-212, a very 
tight and partisan vote, with the majority of Republicans 
voting for the resolution and the majority of Democrats 
voting against it. The House version of the budget 
resolution included a reserve amount of $7.5 billion for FY 
2004 and a total of $400 billion in new budget authority 
and outlays for FY 2004 through 2013 for legislation that 
provided a prescription drug benefit and modernized 
Medicare. 
2. The Budget Conference Agreement 
After receiving the House version of the budget 
resolution, the Senate agreed to meet in conference with 
the House to resolve their differences. The conferees met 
between the 1st and 10th of April, and reported a conference 
agreement, H.Con.Res 95, to each chamber. The conference 
agreement contained language regarding the $400 billion 
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allocation for new Medicare legislation. In both the House 
and Senate versions of the budget resolution, the $400 
billion was to be held in reserve. The funds would be 
available once Congress adopted a joint resolution or a 
conference report “that provides a prescription drug 
benefit and modernizes Medicare, and provides adjustments 
to the Medicare program on a fee-for-service, capitated, or 
other basis” (House of Representatives, 2003, H.Con.Res.95, 
pp. 52-54). Following such action, the Chairmen of the 
Committees on Budget could allocate for the purpose of 
Medicare reform, an amount “not to exceed $7 billion in new 
budget authority in 2004, and $400 billion in new budget 
authority for the period of 2004 through 2013” (House, 
2003, H.Con.Res.95, pp. 52-54). 
The House passed the conference agreement by another 
tight, partisan vote of 216-211. In the Senate, the vote 
was even closer. The Senate agreed to H.Con.Res 95 by a 
vote of 51-50. Vice President Dick Cheney had to break the 
tie. Although the Republicans held a majority in the Senate 
by a margin of 51 Republicans to 48 Democrats with 1 
Independent, the vote was 50-50. Senator Zell Miller (D-
Ga.) crossed party lines to vote for the agreement. 
Senators Lincoln Chafee (R-RI.) and John McCain (R-Ariz.), 
along with Senator James Jeffords (I-Vt.), voted against 
the resolution. 
D. DEVELOPING THE PRESCRIPTION DRUG BILL 
After it was agreed by both chambers in the budget 
resolution to allocate funds for the purpose of providing a 
prescription drug benefit and Medicare reform, Congress was 
required to produce a bill that met the criteria in order 
to have the funds made available in the resolution. This 
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section will focus on the legislative process in both the 
House of Representatives and the Senate, including 
decisions of the committees that have jurisdiction in each 
chamber. 
1. The House of Representatives 
In the first session of the 108th Congress, the House 
Ways and Means committee was led by Bill Thomas (R-Cal.). 
Nancy Johnson (R-Conn.) was head of the subcommittee on 
Health. In the House Energy and Commerce committee, the 
other committee with jurisdiction over Medicare, the 
chairman was Billy Tauzin (R-La.). The subcommittee on 
Health was chaired by Michael Bilirakis (R-Fla.). Early in 
2003, the two subcommittees were given four bills that had 
been introduced in the House early in 2003, all providing a 
prescription drug benefit under the Medicare program. Of 
those bills, three had Democrat sponsors and one had a 
Republican sponsor. One of these bills, H.R. 1199, was 
allowed introductory remarks by the House Ways and Means 
Committee (Subcommittee on Health) on March 12th. No 
consideration was given to any of the other bills, and H.R. 
1199 died in subcommittee. 
The Ways and Means Subcommittee on Health did not have 
any hearings or testimony specifically focused on Medicare 
prescription drugs in 2003. It did hear testimony regarding 
payment and contracting reform, cost-sharing, and 
supplemental insurance (Medigap), all of which were related 
to Medicare reforms that included the prescription drug 
benefit. Four hearings were held between February and May 
of 2003 in which various stakeholders were able to share 
their points of view on these issues. The Energy and 
Commerce Subcommittee on Health heard testimony on 
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“Designing a Twenty-first Century Medicare Prescription 
Drug Benefit” on April 8th. During this hearing, testimony 
was given by several expert witnesses. The witnesses 
included health policy experts from universities, the 
director of The Seniors Coalition, a representative from 
AARP, and other health professionals. The subcommittee took 
more testimony on April 9th, when the topic was 
“Strengthening and Improving Medicare.” The witnesses 
testifying that day included Mr. Rich Foster, the Chief 
Actuary for the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) and Dr. Robert Bereneson, the former Head of the 
Medicare + Choice Services under CMS (then called Health 
Care Financing Administration). Also testifying were 
several representatives from special interest groups, such 
as Aetna insurance, the National Committee to Preserve 
Social Security and Medicare (a membership group), the 
Healthcare Leadership Council (a healthcare industry 
advocate), and Marilyn Moon, of the Urban Institute. 
After the testimony, five more bills were introduced 
in the House, two by Democrats, two by Republicans, and one 
sponsored by an Independent. One of these five bills was 
introduced on June 16th, and over the next three days the 
Energy and Commerce Committee held a full committee mark up 
of the bill. The bill was H.R. 2473, the Medicare 
Prescription Drug and Modernization Act of 2003. This bill 
was co-sponsored by Billy Tauzin (R-La.), the committee 
chairman, and Bill Thomas (R-Cal.), the primary sponsor and 
chairman of the Ways and Means Committee. The committee 
agreed to the bill by a vote of 29-20, and reported it to 
the House. 
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The bill went to full committee mark up in the 
Committee on Ways and Means on the 17th of June. The 
committee amended the bill, and agreed to it the same day 
by a vote of 25-15, then reported it to the House. 
After the two committees reported the bills, H.R. 2473 
was combined with four other Medicare reform bills. The 
last-minute additions were included in hopes of persuading 
some teetering Republicans and Democrats to support it. The 
bills added provisions to allow for the reimportation of 
drugs from Canada, thereby decreasing drug costs, limited 
the ability of pharmaceutical manufacturers to extend 
patents to speed up the approval process for generic drugs, 
added roughly $28 billion in funding for hospitals and 
providers in rural areas, and established two types of tax-
free medical savings accounts to be used for unreimbursed 
medical expenses. The bill was renamed H.R. 1, the Medicare 
Prescription Drug and Modernization Act of 2003. 
H.R. 1 was reported to the full House for a vote on 
June 25th. While the bill was on the floor of the House the 
evening of June 26th, the Republicans extended the vote 
period in the early morning hours of the 27th, and took some 
controversial actions. The vote was scheduled for 15 
minutes. When the time expired, the tally was 210-214, and 
Democrats began to shout for a close to the vote. Democrats 
were almost unanimously against the bill (only 9 voted for 
it, mainly due to the added provisions for rural areas). 
Some moderate conservatives voted against the bill for one 
of the same reasons the Democrats opposed it, they “feared 
the competition provisions in the bill could gut 
traditional Medicare” (Bettelheim, August 2003, p. 690). 
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Over the next 30 minutes, the chairmen of the two 
committees (Thomas and Tauzin) joined Majority Leader Tom 
DeLay and Majority Whip Roy Blunt for visits to about a 
dozen members of their party on the floor who had withheld 
their votes. These more conservative members argued the 
opposite of their moderate colleagues, that “the bill did 
not do enough to promote competition and would merely boost 
government spending by adding a drug benefit” (Bettelheim, 
August 2003, p. 690). 
The deciding ‘yes’ vote was cast by Jo Ann Emerson (R-
Mo.). The price to switch her vote on H.R. 1 was the 
promise that the bill she sponsored would be granted a 
floor vote. Her bill would allow the importation of drugs 
from Food and Drug Administration-approved facilities in 25 
industrial countries, not just Canada, a measure that could 
help lower drug prices for all Americans as well as the 
government (Allen, Graham-Silverman, 2003, p. 1614). 
Another rebellious Republican, and Emerson’s co-sponsor of 
the drug importation bill, Gil Gutknecht (R-Minn.) said 
afterwards: “I probably could have gotten new highways, 
bridges, and probably some troop deployments, but I told 
them no” (Allen, Graham-Silverman, 2003, p. 1614). The 
Republican-sponsored bill passed the House by a vote of 
216-215, with 19 GOP members voting against it. 
2. Senate 
In the Senate, the Committee on Finance had 
jurisdiction over Medicare legislation. Two bills were 
introduced in the Senate. On January 7th a bill sponsored by 
Senator Tom Daschle (D-SD.) was introduced and referred to 
the Committee on Finance where it subsequently died. The 
committee held hearings on the 3rd of April regarding 
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“Purchasing Health Care Services in a Competitive 
Environment.” Testimony was given by an advisor for 
Employee and Family Policy at the federal Office of 
Personnel Management, the Deputy Secretary of Defense for 
Health Plan Administration, and two representatives from 
private health insurance groups. On June 6th, the committee 
held another session on “Strengthening and Improving the 
Medicare Program.” Testimony was heard from Thomas Scully, 
Administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services. Other witnesses included an independent 
consultant and Marilyn Moon from the Health Policy Center 
at the Urban Institute. 
Five days later, on June 11th, a bill co-sponsored by 
Finance Committee chairman Bill Frist (R-Tenn.) and Max 
Baucus (D-Mont.) was introduced. The following day, a 
committee hearing to consider this bipartisan bill (S. 1) 
was held. The bill was approved by the Finance Committee by 
a 16-5 vote that same day. This was a significant 
achievement for the Committee on Finance, as it marked the 
first time in five years that a Medicare reform bill would 
go to the Senate floor for debate. 
Debate on the Senate floor for S. 1 commenced on June 
18th. Over 100 amendments were submitted for addition to the 
bill, and 58 amendments were agreed to. The addition of 
amendments important to both parties continued to make the 
bill more bipartisan than the more conservative version in 
the House. S. 1, the Prescription Drug and Medicare 
Improvement Act of 2003, passed the Senate by a vote of 76-
21. After H.R. 1 was received by the Senate, they amended 
the entire bill with the language of S.1, and returned H.R. 
1 to the House. The House agreed to disagree with the 
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Senate version of the bill, and arranged a conference with 
the Senate to resolve the differences. 
E. COMPARISON OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE BILLS 
The Senate and House Medicare bills had the same basic 
structure for the prescription drug benefit, but the devil 
was in the details. This section describes the major 
prescription drug provisions in each bill, and discusses 
the areas where compromise was required when the bills went 
to conference between the two chambers. Table 4.2 shows a 
comparison of the two bills as passed by the House and the 
Senate, and the final conference agreement that became 
Public Law 108-173. 
 
Table 4.2. Summary of the Provisions of the Medicare 





1. Provisions of the House Bill 
a. Enrollment Eligibility 
Similar to bills passed in the House in recent 
years, the House bill, H.R. 1, called for voluntary 
enrollment of Medicare beneficiaries in a new Part D of 
Medicare that would begin in 2006. Drug coverage would be 
provided through private plans offering drug-only coverage 
for those beneficiaries wanting to remain in traditional 
Medicare. They would also be able to receive drug coverage 
in Part C of Medicare, renamed “Medicare Advantage” plans. 
A new Part E, or Enhanced Fee-for-Service (EFFS) plan, 
would provide benefits for Medicare Parts A, B, and D all 
in one plan. In the meantime, a drug discount card would be 
available in 2004 along with subsidies for those without 
drug coverage. 
b. Premiums, Deductibles, and Co-Insurance 
The monthly premiums for H.R. 1 were estimated at 
$35.50, with an annual deductible of $250. After the 
initial $250, beneficiaries would pay a 20 percent co-
insurance until the initial coverage limit of $2000 (or a 
benefit cap of $1400). Beneficiaries would then pay 100 
percent of the costs until they reached the maximum out-of-
pocket limit, or catastrophic cap, of $3500. The “doughnut 
hole” in this bill would be $2850. Higher income 
individuals, with adjusted gross incomes over $60,000 
($120,000 for couples) would have higher out-of-pocket 
limits. The thresholds for these wealthier beneficiaries 
would be determined by the HHS Secretary. All of these 
figures were based on a start date of 2006 for the benefit 
and indexed for subsequent years. 
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c. Low-income Provisions 
Low-income subsidies would also be available for 
enrollees with incomes up to 135 percent of poverty level 
($6000 individuals/$9000 couples). This would also include 
those eligible for Medicaid. These beneficiaries would not 
have an annual deductible, nor have to pay a premium for 
the standard drug coverage. The cost-sharing for those 
under the 135 percent level would be no more than $2 for 
generics and $5 for brand-name drugs up to the initial 
coverage limit. There would be no subsidies for the costs 
of drugs between the initial coverage limit and the out-of-
pocket limit. Sliding-scale subsidies would be available 
for annual premiums for those enrollees with incomes 
between 135 percent and 150 percent of poverty. The 
Congressional Budget Office estimated that the prescription 
drug benefit of the H.R. 1 proposal would cost $415 billion 
over 10 years, all financed from the Treasury’s general 
fund. They also estimated that 93 percent of eligible 
beneficiaries would participate in Part D. 
2. Provisions of the Senate Bill 
a. Enrollment Eligibility 
The Senate bill, S. 1, also called for a 
voluntary outpatient drug benefit added through a new Part 
D to begin in 2006. Unless beneficiaries were already 
enrolled in Medicaid, they would be eligible for Part D. 
Drug coverage would be available through private plans 
offering drug-only coverage or through Part C, renamed 
“Medicare Advantage” plans which would offer an integrated 
package of Medicare benefits with drug coverage. A drug 
discount card would be available in 2004 as a low-income 
subsidy until the benefit went into effect. 
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b. Premiums, Deductibles, and Co-Insurance 
The monthly premiums under S. 1 were estimated at 
$34. The annual deductible would be $275. After the initial 
$275, beneficiaries would pay a 50 percent co-insurance 
until total drug expenditures were $4,500, then 100 percent 
over $4,500 until they reached the maximum out-of-pocket 
limit, or catastrophic cap, of $3,700. The “doughnut hole” 
in this bill was $1,175. Then beneficiaries would pay 10 
percent cost-sharing for all additional drugs. There would 
be no provision for higher catastrophic cap limits for 
higher income beneficiaries in the Senate version. 
c. Low-income Provisions 
Low-income subsidies in this bill are generally 
more complicated. The Senate bill would not allow 
beneficiaries eligible and enrolled for both Medicaid and 
Medicare to enroll in Medicare Part D plans (i.e., does not 
allow dual-eligible drug enrollment). One needs to know the 
definitions of QMB, SLMB, and QI to understand the 
subsidies granted to each group. A QMB is a Qualified 
Medicare Beneficiary whose income is below 100 percent of 
the poverty level and has limited assets. SLMB is a 
Specified Low-Income Beneficiary with an income between 100 
percent and 120 percent of poverty. And a QI is a Qualified 
Individual whose income is between 120 percent and 130 
percent of poverty. The Senate bill would cover all 
premiums and deductibles for those with incomes under 135 
percent of poverty (including all QMBs, SLMBs, and QIs). 
QMBs would have no deductibles and pay a 2.5 percent 
coinsurance up to the initial coverage limit ($4500), then 
five percent to the out-of-pocket limit ($3700). SLMBs and 
QIs would have to pay a five percent coinsurance until 
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$4500, then ten percent until they met their out-of-pocket 
limit. Beneficiaries with incomes between 135 percent and 
160 percent of poverty would receive premium subsidies on a 
sliding scale, pay a $50 deductible, and pay ten percent 
co-insurance up to $4500, then 20 percent up to the out-of-
pocket limit. H.R. 1 provides more up-front benefit, but 
requires more out-of-pocket costs in the long-term than 
S.1, depending on the beneficiaries’ annual drug costs. 
The Congressional Budget Office estimated that 
the prescription drug benefit under the Senate bill would 
cost $422 billion over 10 years, all financed by the 
Treasury’s general fund. CBO also estimated that 75 percent 
of beneficiaries would participate in the voluntary Part D 
of Medicare. 
3. Other Major Differences 
Besides the prescription drug provisions and low-
income subsidies, there were other issues in H.R. 1 and S. 
1 that affected the possibility of an agreement between the 
two chambers. These included the level of responsibility 
that the government would undertake, the degree of 
competition in private plans, and creation of medical 
savings accounts. 
The Senate bill made a condition in which a 
government-run option for prescription drug and/or health 
care benefits would be available to beneficiaries if there 
were not more than two private plans in an area where a 
beneficiary needed care. This would provide beneficiaries 
with more than two options to find adequate coverage. The 
GOP-backed House bill did not include the government-run 
option. Senate Democrats warned that they would not support 
a bill from the House that lacked language providing a 
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government-sponsored fallback plan if the private health 
plans chose to withdraw from certain low-profit geographic 
regions. The President warned that this option could 
“discourage private entities from bearing the insurance 
risk for prescription drug coverage” (Adams, Carey, 2003, 
p. 1611). 
Another issue related to private plans was whether 
traditional Medicare would have to compete against private 
plans on the basis of price. The Republican proviso was to 
have competition phased in over a five-year period. This 
was a favored plan of conservatives because they believed 
it would help keep program costs lower. The bipartisan S.1 
would allow a more limited type of competition. When the 
benefit went into effect, private plans could bid against 
each other, but their payments would be limited by the 
rates for traditional Medicare. Beginning in 2009, private 
plans in select areas could bid directly against each other 
on price, but not directly with traditional Medicare (CQ 
Weekly, 2003, p. 1617). Forty-two Republicans in the House 
warned that they would not support a conference report that 
did not include the direct competition. 
Lastly, when H.R. 1 was created by the combination of 
several bills, one of the bills added language to create 
two tax-preferred personal savings accounts for non-covered 
or unreimbursed medical expenses such as drugs or other 
care. The Senate bill did not create the same provision (CQ 
Weekly, 2003, p. 1617). 
F. THE HOUSE-SENATE CONFERENCE 
Prior to approval of the bills in each chamber, the 
White House sent a Statement of Administration Policy to 
the bills’ sponsors and committee leadership. The 
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statements were largely pragmatic, but told the lawmakers 
that the “Administration look[ed] forward to working with 
Congress to improve” (OMB, June 2003) certain provisions. 
Most of the provisions needing improvement were unrelated 
to prescription drug benefits, with the exception of those 
mentioned previously in this chapter, namely the Senate’s 
‘fallback’ provisions and the House’s income-related 
catastrophic limits for higher-income beneficiaries. 
Considering the tight vote in the House for H.R. 1, 
the differences in the more bipartisan S. 1, and the fact 
that a conference agreement only needed 51 votes in the 
Senate, the GOP knew they could lose a dozen votes in the 
Senate and still pass the conference agreement. 
There were 17 lawmakers selected to be conferees for 
the Medicare bill, the majority of whom were Republicans. 
The conferees selected by the House were mainly committee 
and subcommittee leadership (chairs and ranking members) as 
well as sponsors of bills on Medicare in 2003. Most have 
been mentioned previously in this thesis, and included, 
Rep. Bill Thomas (R-Cal.), Rep. Billy Tauzin (R-La.), Rep. 
Tom DeLay (R-Tex.), Rep. Michael Bilirakis (R-Fla.), Rep 
Nancy Johnson (R-Conn.), Rep. John Dingell (D-Mich.), Rep. 
Charles Rangel (D-NY.), and Rep Marion Berry (D-Ark.). 
Similarly, in the Senate, the conferees included the 
leadership and moderate Democrats. The Senate conferees 
included Sen. Bill Frist (R-Tenn.), Sen. Charles Grassley 
(R-Iowa), Sen. Don Nickles (R-Okla.), Sen Jon Kyl, (R-
Ariz.), Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), Sen. Tom Daschle (D-
SD.), Sen John Breaux (D-La.), Sen John Rockefeller (D-
W.Va.), and Sen. Max Baucus (D-Mont.). The Conference 
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between the House and Senate on the two bills began on the 
14th of July. 
At the beginning of the conference, the Republicans 
kept the Democrat conferees out of the negotiations with 
the exception of two senators: Baucus and Breaux. No House 
Democrats were included, nor was the Senate majority 
leader, Daschle. In early November, talks between the 
conference members got bogged down on two main issues. An 
agreement could not be reached on the level of competition 
and whether to “give tens of billions of dollars in 
subsidies and tax credits to employers” (Carey, 2003, p. 
2827) in order to provide an incentive for them to maintain 
coverage for retirees currently covered under their plans. 
As proposed in each chamber, the gaps in coverage and 
high out-of-pocket costs would likely make seniors feel 
cheated, especially if they were required to pay monthly 
premiums and received no benefits while they were in the 
doughnut hole. Of course, in order to keep the cost of the 
legislation under $400 billion, it was necessary to have 
gaps in coverage. 
The conference agreement represented a compilation of 
compromises on both the House and the Senate side. The 
final congressional step was gaining approval in both 
chambers. Many attempts were made to bring the bill to a 
vote in the House, but none were accepted until over four 
months after the conference committee began, on the 21st of 
November. Through the evening of the 21st into the morning 
of November 22nd, the House considered the conference report 
for H.R. 1 (H. Rept. 108-391), the Medicare Prescription 
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003. The 
report was agreed to by a vote of 220-215. It was agreed to 
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in the Senate by a vote of 54-44 on November 25th. The bill 
was sent to President Bush who, on December 8th, signed it 
into law as Public Law 108-173. 
G. PROVISIONS OF THE DRUG BENEFIT IN FINAL BILL 
The prescription drug benefit, as enacted in the 
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization 
Act of 2003, takes full effect in January of 2006. Until 
that time, an interim Medicare-endorsed discount drug card 
and transitional assistance program would be available 
beginning in June 2004. The Drug Discount Card was 
estimated to provide a savings of 10 percent or more for 
enrolled Medicare beneficiaries. 
Additional assistance of $600 per year would be 
provided to beneficiaries with incomes below 135 percent of 
poverty ($12,569 single/ $16,862 couple in 2004) if they 
did not have private or Medicaid drug coverage. 
1. Enrollment Eligibility 
Beneficiaries would have the option of enrolling in a 
Medicare drug plan beginning in November of 2005, and 
benefits would begin in January of 2006. Beneficiaries 
could remain in traditional fee-for-service Medicare and 
elect to enroll in new Medicare Part D, a separate private 
prescription drug plan (PDP). Beneficiaries could also 
enroll in an integrated Medicare Part C, renamed Medicare 
Advantage (MA). MA plans combine Parts A, B, and D, and are 
administered by a private insurance plan or health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs). If two or more plans, 
including at least one PDP, are not available in a 
beneficiary’s local region, Medicare would contract with a 
“fallback” plan to serve beneficiaries (Kaiser Family 
Foundation [KFF], December 2003). 
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2. Premiums, Deductibles, and Co-Insurance 
The monthly premiums would be approximately $35 per 
month. The annual deductible would be $250. After the 
initial $250, beneficiaries would pay a 25 percent co-
insurance until the initial coverage limit of $2,250 (or a 
benefit cap of $1,500). Beneficiaries would then pay 100 
percent of the costs until they reached the maximum out-of-
pocket limit, or catastrophic cap, of $3,600. The “doughnut 
hole” in this bill would be $2,850. The premiums, 
deductibles, benefit caps, and out-of-pocket limits were 
all based on a 2006 start time, and indexed for subsequent 
years. Figure 4.1 illustrates the benefits and out-of-
pocket payments of the final law. 
 
Figure 4.1. Provisions of the Medicare Drug Benefit, 
Enacted December 2003 (From Kaiser Family Foundation, 
November 2003). 
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3. Low-income Provisions 
Table 4.3 illustrates the low-income provisions for the new 
Medicare drug benefit. Those with incomes up to 135 percent 
of poverty level and limited savings, would not have an 
annual deductible, nor have to pay monthly premiums for the 
standard drug coverage. The cost-sharing for those under 
the 135 percent level would be no more than $2 for generics 
and $5 for brand-name drugs, up to the out-of-pocket limit 
of $3,600. Those with incomes below 100 percent of poverty 
($9,310 single/$12,490 couple) would be dual eligible for 
Medicare and Medicaid. The cost-sharing for those under 100 
percent of poverty would be $1 and $3 co-pays. There would 
be no gap in coverage for these beneficiaries, and there 
would be no co-pay for all prescriptions after the out-of-
pocket limit is reached. 
Beneficiaries with incomes less than 150 percent of 
poverty ($13,965 single/$18,735 couple), but greater than 
135 percent, would have sliding-scale subsidies for 
premiums to be determined by the HHS. Their annual 
deductible would be $50, and cost-sharing would be 15 
percent of total drug costs up to the out-of-pocket limit. 
There would be no gap in coverage, and the co-pay for drugs 
would be $2 for generic and $5 for brand-name after the 
out-of-pocket limit had been reached. 
The Congressional Budget Office estimated that in 2006 
there would be approximately 6.3 million dual-eligible 
beneficiaries, 5.8 million with incomes below 135 percent 
of poverty, and 1.9 million with incomes between 135 and 
150 percent of poverty. This estimate indicated that one-
third of Medicare beneficiaries would be eligible for low-




Table 4.3. Subsidies for Low-Income Beneficiaries in 
P.L. 108-173 (From Federal Register, 2004, p. 46731). 
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Upon passage of P.L. 108-173, the Congressional Budget 
Office estimated that the prescription drug benefit would 
cost $410 billion over 10 years, all financed from the 
Treasury’s general fund. According to CBO, 87 percent of 
beneficiaries would enroll in Part D of Medicare, and nine 
percent of Medicare beneficiaries would enroll in the 
Medicare Advantage. 
4. Other Provisions and Benefit Changes 
Other changes were made to Medicare in an effort to 
reform the 38-year old program and secure its availability 
to future beneficiaries. These changes have the potential 
to be extremely controversial because they represent 
further means-testing of Medicare benefits. 
a. Changes in the Part B Deductible 
The Medicare Part B deductible had not been 
changed since 1991. The new law stipulates that the 
deductible will increase to $110 in 2005, and will continue 
to be increased annually by a percentage equal to the 
annual increase in Part B expenditures. This means that the 
higher the rate of increase in Part B expenditures, the 
higher the rate of increase to the Part B deductible (KFF, 
December 2003). 
b. Changes to Part B Premiums 
Medicare beneficiaries pay premiums that cover 
about 25 percent of Part B costs. The other 75 percent is 
funded by revenues from the Treasury’s general fund. The 
Part B monthly premiums are withheld from beneficiaries’ 
monthly Social Security checks. The Part B premium in 2004 
was $66.60, and is a uniform price for all beneficiaries. 
Each year premiums are increased to reflect general growth 
in health care costs, such as higher payments to physicians 
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or privately managed Medicare health plans, and to build 
trust fund reserves. 
In addition to the annual premium increases, 
beginning in 2007, beneficiaries with higher incomes will 
have to pay higher premiums. For those with incomes between 
$80,000 and $100,000, premiums would be 35 percent. 
Premiums will be 50 percent for those with incomes between 
$100,000 and $150,000. For beneficiaries with incomes 
between $150,000 and $200,000, the premium will be 65 
percent. For those above $200,000, the premium will be 80 
percent. The income thresholds for married couples are 
double the income amounts described above. CBO estimates 
that between the years 2007 and 2013, the government will 
save $13 billion in income-related part B premiums (Kaiser, 
December 2003). 
H. A BILL SURROUNDED BY CONTROVERSY 
There were many issues at stake in the fight over the 
Medicare drug bill. Political groups who represented the 
interests of their members lobbied Congress heavily during 
the period that the drug bill was being considered. Most of 
the controversy revolved around conflicts of interest and 
campaign donations. 
1. Conflicts of Interest 
a. AARP 
One controversial issue arose near the end of 
November before the conference agreement had been resolved. 
During the conference between the House and the Senate, 
AARP endorsed the Republican version of the Medicare 
prescription drug bill, H.R. 1. The Democratic 
congressional leadership (Tom Daschle, Senate Minority 
Leader, and Nancy Pelosi, House Minority Leader) wrote a 
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letter to the Chief Executive Officer of AARP, William 
Novelli, requesting him to justify AARP’s backing of the 
bill. While a poll indicated that the majority of AARP’s 
members did not favor the Medicare bill, the leadership 
asked that AARP make a commitment not to profit from the 
sale of discount drug cards, pharmacy benefit plans, or 
other managed care plans to Medicare beneficiaries in order 
to “dispel any perception of a possible conflict of 
interest” (Daschle, Pelosi, 2003). 
USA Today reported that AARP’s insurance business 
was roughly one-third of its total income. The political 
watch dog, Public Citizen, said insurance-related business 
accounted for 60 percent of the organization’s annual 
revenues. With provisions for private health plans to offer 
drug-only coverage as well as integrated Medicare plans, 
AARP could benefit greatly from the House version of the 
Medicare reform bill as a profit-earning insurance broker. 
b. Campaign Contributions 
According to the November 24th Capital Eye, a 
newsletter by the Center for Responsive Politics, 
Republican House members who voted for the prescription 
drug bill on November 22nd raised an average of $28,500 from 
pharmaceutical companies, compared to $8,112 for the 
Republican lawmakers who voted against the bill. Private 
health insurers donated an average of $19,286 to House 
Republicans who voted for the bill, as opposed to $13,828 
to those who voted against it. For the Democrats, the “yes” 
voters received an average of $16,296 from pharmaceutical 
companies and $22,736 from health insurers, while the 
Democrats who voted “no” averaged $11,791 and $9,692, 
respectively (Capital Eye, 2003). 
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c. Scully’s Employment Seeking 
After the new Medicare bill was signed into law, 
Thomas Scully, Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
Administrator, announced that he would be taking a job with 
a law firm named Alston & Bird, a lobbying firm for health 
care industry companies, and would work part-time for 
Welsh, Carson Anderson & Stowe, an investment firm. While 
Scully was head of CMS, he disclosed to his supervisor, the 
Secretary of HHS, Tommy Thompson, that he was seeking other 
employment. According to Public Citizen, a minimum of 41 
companies or associations were connected to three of 
Scully’s employment interests and had financial interests 
in the Medicare legislation. The three firms Scully 
considered lobbied for approximately 30 companies or 
associations that were affected by the new Medicare law. 
Two of the investment firms he had talks with had 
substantial financial stakes in at least 11 companies 
affected by the law (Public Citizen, 2003). 
2. The Unattainable Cost Estimates 
One of the major points of contention of the Medicare 
bill was the cost. CBO estimated that the Medicare bill, 
including the drug benefit, would cost $395 billion over 
ten years. The CMS had an estimate of over $100 billion 
more, at $534 billion. Lawmakers, however, were not given 
this information. According to the chief actuary, Richard 
Foster, he was directed by his boss, Thomas Scully, not to 
answer any questions from Congress regarding the estimated 
costs of the Medicare bill, and was threatened to be fired 
from his job, if he did. If conservatives and moderate 
Republicans were aware of a cost greater than the $400 
billion set aside by Congress, the bill would have had even 
more difficulty getting the requisite votes to pass. 
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I. SUMMARY 
This chapter focused on the creation, approval, and 
passage of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003. It discussed the bills 
introduced in the House and the Senate in 2003 and 
described the process that the bills followed in each 
chamber. Also discussed were the major issues that were 
negotiated between the two bills, and the results of the 
compromise that was finally reached. Lastly, the chapter 
covered some of the controversy which surrounded the bill 
after passage. 
Chapter five discusses the fiscal impacts of the final 
version of the bill and the unfinished business the second 
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the accuracy of the cost 
estimates available to Congress when it passed the Medicare 
bill, explains the differences between CBO estimates and 
the estimates made by the Bush Administration, and 
lawmakers’ reactions to information related to the cost of 
the bill received after it was signed into law. After 
consideration of the fiscal impacts of the final version of 
the bill, unfinished business related to Medicare reform 
and the prescription drug benefit is identified. Finally, 
the chapter summarizes the main issues in the thesis, and 
makes recommendations for future research. 
B. COST ESTIMATES OF THE MEDICARE BILL 
Estimating the costs of open-ended benefits such as 
prescription drug coverage is loaded with uncertainty. 
Actuaries are faced with making assumptions on utilization 
and behavior of groups of people as well as behaviors of 
the economy and private industry. All this uncertainty, and 
small changes to assumptions, can create big differences in 
estimated costs. The difficulty of making assumptions for 
these variables has been known since the beginning of the 
Medicare debate in the 1960s. Not only are estimates 
dependent on the behavior of beneficiaries, but also on the 
future prices of drugs - many of which have not been 
developed or marketed – as well as other economic 
projections (Schuler, 2004, p.750). 
One month after the Medicare bill had been signed into 
law, new estimates were released by the Bush Administration 
through the HHS and CMS. The estimates were drastically 
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different than the estimates made by CBO prior to House and 
Senate agreement on the conference report in November. 
1. Estimates by the Congressional Budget Office 
The Congressional Budget Office is the entity Congress 
is obligated to use, by its own rules, to “score” the 
budgetary impacts of legislation. When the Congressional 
Budget Resolution was agreed upon in March of 2003, the 
$400 billion price tag was set, and whatever legislation 
was agreed upon for the addition of benefits and reform to 
Medicare, it was required to fall within the negotiated 
limit. 
CBO estimated that the overall cost of the Medicare 
bill would be $395 billion over 10 years, and the 
prescription drug portion of that would be $422 billion. 
CBO estimated savings of $27 billion to offset the higher 
costs of the drug benefit that would come from changes in 
Fraud, Waste, and Abuse procedures, Fee-for-Service 
provisions, cost containment efforts, and faster access to 
generic drugs. 
2. Estimates by the Bush Administration 
In January of 2004, the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services and Department of Health of Human 
Services released estimates for the Medicare bill that 
disagreed with the CBO estimates. The Administration’s 
estimates said the new provisions would cost $139 billion 
more over 10 years, or more than $534 billion. The 
disparity caused an uproar between Democrats and 
Republicans in Congress. 
3. Reasons for the Disparity in Estimates 
On February 2nd of 2004, CBO provided an explanation of 
the differences between the Administration and the CBO 
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estimates. The differences were accounted for in three 
major areas related to the prescription drug benefit: the 
participation rate of Medicare beneficiaries in Part D, the 
participation rate of beneficiaries in low-income 
subsidies, and savings in the Medicaid program. Another 
reason for the differences was the anticipated 
participation rate in the new Medicare Advantage (formerly 
Medicare + Choice). 
a. Participation in Part D 
CBO estimated that 87 percent of beneficiaries 
would participate in the basic Part D benefits, while the 
Administration assumed 94 percent of beneficiaries would 
participate. This accounted for a difference of $32 billion 
in the cost of the basic benefit. CBO estimated that 
enrollees who currently decline Part B coverage would also 
not participate in Part D, nor would beneficiaries with 
more generous prescription drug coverage from the Federal 
Employees Health Benefits program or Tricare-For-Life 
(military retiree health care) participate in Part D 
(Holtz-Eakin, 2004). 
b. Participation in Low-Income Subsidy 
CBO estimated that participation in the low-
income subsidy would increase over a three-year period 
while the Administration estimated an immediate increase. 
The Administration also assumed roughly a 15 percent higher 
participation rate than CBO. CBO based its rate on the 
current low-income subsidy programs. There was also a 
difference in the per capita costs assumed by each 
organization. The Administration assumed a seven to ten 
percent higher per capita cost than CBO. All of these 
differences amounted to approximately $47 billion of the 
$139 billion disparity. 
94 
c. Savings in Medicaid 
The savings in the Medicaid program assumed by 
CBO was based on provisions of the Medicare prescription 
drug benefit that would end the need for Medicaid providing 
prescription drugs to dual eligible beneficiaries. CBO 
estimated the savings to be approximately $141 billion, 
whereas the Administration assumed a $123 billion savings. 
The difference here was $18 billion. 
d. Medicare Advantage (MA) Participation 
The Administration assumed a higher participation 
rate in MA than CBO. CBO estimated only nine percent of 
beneficiaries would enroll in MA, while the Administration 
assumed a 32-percent participation rate. This difference in 
participation rate accounted for a $32 billion cost 
difference. 
All together, CBO’s explanation accounted for 
$129 billion of the $139 billion difference between the 
cost estimates. The assumptions that each organization made 
are legitimate, but the uncertainty makes the assumptions 
particularly difficult to depend on. Until the new benefit 
is implemented, there is no completely error-free estimate 
of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003. 
C. UNFINISHED BUSINESS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Soon after the Medicare bill was signed into law, 
legislation intended to change it was introduced in the 
House and the Senate. The 2nd session of the 108th Congress 
was faced with more attempts to correct what some lawmakers 
thought were the shortcomings of the Medicare bill in 2003. 
This legislation addressed various issues, including 
direct negotiations by the Secretary of HHS with 
95 
pharmaceutical manufacturers, pharmacies, and prescription 
drug plans to obtain the best price for prescription drugs 
for Medicare beneficiaries by using its volumetric 
leverage. Additional legislation would allow the 
reimportation of drugs from certain pre-approved 
industrialized countries in order to save consumers and the 
government money. The House version of the Medicare bill in 
2003 had language that would have allowed reimportation, in 
hopes of winning GOP votes, but the provision was dropped 
in conference. 
More discontent in the Medicare law came from 
oncologists, whose physician-dispensed cancer treatment 
reimbursement would be affected by the legislation. New 
legislation introduced in late 2003 and in 2004 would 
provide an opportunity to change the law for these 
providers. 
It became clear during the evolution of the 
legislation for Medicare reform and prescription drug 
coverage that there were many interests that would be 
affected by legislation. Every aspect of the Medicare 
program, providers, consumers, as well as private industry, 
was affected by the Medicare law of 2003. Achieving a 
positive outcome for one group would negatively affect 
another group. Creating legislation that would appease all 
of the stakeholder groups would be impossible. The result 
was a benefit with gaps, which would provide help to some, 
but not to others, but still cost the general tax-paying 





D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The primary purpose of this thesis was to discuss the 
major policy compromises underlying the Medicare 
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 
2003 and the major problems that have been identified 
subsequent to the passage. 
Chapter I provided an introduction to the thesis, 
discussed the goals, and the methodology used to achieve 
them. Chapter II provided background on the Medicare 
program, the issues lawmakers were required to consider, 
and long-term problems and uncertainties in health care 
reform and the prescription drug issue. Chapter III 
introduced attempts made to reform the Medicare program to 
include prescription drug benefits, and explained the roles 
played by partisan politics and special interest groups in 
the legislation. Chapter IV focused on the process the 
legislation followed in 2003, discussed the major 
compromises that were made, and provided an overview of the 
major provisions of the final legislation. This chapter 
also discussed the problems and controversy that followed 
from the passage of the Medicare legislation. Chapter V 
addressed the problems with the cost estimates of the 
Medicare legislation, explained the uncertainty involved, 
and introduced the problems that are being addressed in the 
second session of the 108th Congress. 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Future research consideration should be given to the 
impacts of new legislation on the Medicare program, the 
true benefit realized by Medicare beneficiaries based on 
level of income and annual drug expenditures, and, once the 
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Medicare prescription drug benefit is implemented, actual 
costs incurred by the new coverage added by the Medicare 
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Chronology of Legislative Events in 2003 Associated With 






07 January Rep. Capito (R., W.Va.) introduced H.R. 38 to provide for a voluntary Medicare 
outpatient prescription drug benefit program. Bill subsequently died in 
subcommittee. 
 
 Senator Daschle (D., SD.) introduced S. 7 to provide coverage of outpatient 
prescription drugs under the Medicare program and to amend the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to provide greater access to 
affordable pharmaceuticals. Bill subsequently died in committee. 
 
28 January President Bush declared intention to provide a prescription drug benefit under 
Medicare in his State of the Union Address. 
 
03 February Congress received President Bush’s FY04 budget proposal which included 
$400 billion over ten years for Medicare modernization and addition of a 
prescription drug benefit. 
 
04-05 February Senate and House Budget Committees took testimony from OMB Director on 
the President’s FY04 budget proposals. 
 
06 February House Ways and Means Committee took testimony from HHS Secretary on the 
President’s FY04 budget proposal regarding Medicare reform. 
 
13 February House Ways and Means Committee (Subcommittee on Health) heard testimony 
on “Medicare Regulatory and Contracting Reform”. 
 
25 February House Ways and Means Committee (Subcommittee on Health) heard testimony 
on “Eliminating barriers to Chronic Care Management in Medicare”. 
 
26 February Senate and House Budget Committees took testimony on Medicare reform from 
HHS Secretary on President’s FY04 budget for the Department of HHS. 
 
27 February Senate Committee on Finance took testimony from HHS Secretary on the 
Administration's FY04 Health Care Priorities 
 
03 March Rep. Engel (D., NY.) introduced H.R. 1045 to provide for coverage of outpatient 
prescription drugs under part B of the Medicare Program. Bill 
subsequently died in subcommittee. 
 
04 March President Bush announced his Framework to Modernize and Improve Medicare 
in a conference with the members of the American Medical Association. 
 
06 March House Ways and Means Committee (Subcommittee on Health) heard testimony 
on the “MedPAC Report on Medicare Payment Policies”. 
 
12 March House Budget Committee marked up FY04 budget resolution (H.Con.Res. 95) 
112 
which added language requiring joint resolution or conference 
agreement to be passed in order to allocate funds for Medicare reform 
and the addition of a prescription drug benefit. 
 
12 March Introductory remarks were heard on measure H.R. 1199 to provide for a 
voluntary Medicare prescription medicine benefit and greater access to 
affordable pharmaceuticals, in House Ways and Means-Subcommittee 
on Health. Bill subsequently died in subcommittee. 
 
12-13 March Senate Budget Committee marked up FY04 budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 23) 
which included language requiring a joint resolution or conference 
agreement to be passed in order to allocate funds for Medicare reform 
and the addition of a prescription drug benefit. 
 
21 March H.Con.Res. 95 agreed to in the House by a vote of  215-212. 
 
26 March S.Con.Res. 23 agreed to in the Senate by a vote of 56-44. 
 
01-10 April House and Senate conference on Budget for FY04. 
 
02 April Rep. Dooley (D.,Cal.) introduced H.R. 1568 to provide for a prescription drug 
benefit for Medicare beneficiaries. Bill subsequently died in 
subcommittee. 
 
03 April Senate Committee on Finance heard testimony on “Purchasing Health Care 
Services in a Competitive Environment.” 
 
08-09 April House Energy and Commerce Committee (Subcommittee on Health) held 
hearings on “Designing a Twenty-First Century Medicare Prescription 
Drug Benefit” and “Strengthening and Improving Medicare.” 
 
09 April House Ways and Means Committee heard testimony on “Expanding Coverage 
of Prescription Drugs in Medicare.” 
 
10 April Rep. Crowley (D., NY.) introduced H.R. 1733 to provide for a voluntary 
Medicare prescription medicine benefit. Bill subsequently died in 
subcommittee. 
 
11 April House agreed to conference agreement on the Congressional Budget 
Resolution for FY 2004 (H.Rept. 108-71) by a vote of 216-211; Senate 
agreed to conference agreement by a vote of 51-50. 
 
01 May House Ways and Means Committee (Subcommittee on Health) heard testimony 
on “Medicare Cost-Sharing and Medigap.” 
 
06 June Senate Committee on Finance heard testimony on “Strengthening and 
Improving the Medicare Program.” 
 
11 June Senators Frist (R., Tenn.) and Baucus (D., Mont.) introduced S. 1, a bipartisan 
measure, to provide for a voluntary prescription drug benefit under the 
Medicare program and to strengthen and improve the Medicare 
program. 
 
12 June Rep. Sanchez (D., Cal.) introduced H.R. 2461 to establish a Medicare 
prescription drug benefit covering costs that exceed a percentage of a 
beneficiary's income. Bill subsequently died in committee. 
113 
12 June Rep. Terry (R., Neb.) introduced H.R. 2469 to provide under Medicare a health 
care program similar to that for Federal employees under the Federal 
Employees Health Benefits Program (which includes prescription drug 
benefits). Introductory remarks were heard, but the bill subsequently 
died in committee. 
 
12 June Senate Committee on Finance held mark up session to consider S. 1, The 
Prescription Drug and Medicare Improvement Act of 2003. Committee 
approved the bill by a vote of 16-5. 
 
16 June Representatives Thomas (R., Cal.) and Tauzin (D., La.) introduced H.R. 2473 to 
provide for a voluntary program for prescription drug coverage under 
the Medicare Program and to modernize the Medicare Program. Bill 
referred to Ways and Means and Energy and Commerce Committees. 
 
17 June Rep. Sanders (I., Vt.) introduced H.R. 2498 to provide a prescription drug 
benefit program for all Medicare beneficiaries. Bill subsequently died in 
committee. 
 
17 - 19 June H.R. 2473 referred to the House Energy and Commerce Committee for Full 
Committee consideration and mark up. Committee agreed to the bill by 
a vote of 25-15. H.R. 2473 renamed H.R. 1. 
 
18 – 26 June Senate considered S. 1 with amendments. 
 
24 June Rep. Burr (R., NC.) introduced H.R. 2578 to establish a voluntary Medicare 
outpatient prescription drug discount and security program. Bill 
subsequently died in committee. 
 
25 June Rep. Thompson (D., Cal.) introduced H.R. 2606 to provide prescription drug 
coverage under the Medicare program and to make improvements in 
Medicare payment for rural providers. Bill subsequently died in 
committee. 
 
26-27 June House considered H.R. 1 (Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization Act of 
2003). H.R.1 passed House by a vote of 216-215. 
 
27 June Senate passed S. 1 by a vote of 76-21. 
 
14 July House and Senate began conference to resolve differences between House- 
and Senate-passed Medicare reform bills. 
 
21 November Conference Agreement (H.Rpt. 108-391), Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, received by House and 
Senate. 
 
22 November House passed H.Rpt. 108-391 by a vote of 220-215. 
 
25 November Senate passed H.Rpt. 108-391 by a vote of 54-44. 
 
08 December President Bush signed the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
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